The origins of technology in education : the role of federal interventions and national emergencies during the early evolution of instructional technology and media (1940-1960) by Cortez, J. José
THE ORIGINS OF
TECHNOLOGY IN EDUCATION
The Role of Federal Interventions and National Emergencies 
During the Early Evolution of Instructional Technology and Media 
(1940-1960)
Thesis
Submitted to
The School of Education of the
UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The degree
Master of Science in Education
by
J. Jose Cortez
UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON
Dayton, Ohio
May 2002
APPROVED BY:
Thomas C. Hunt, Ph.D.
(Thesis Advisor and Committee Chair, University of Dayton)
Charles P. Russo, ^6., Ed~D.
(Thesis Committee Member, University of Dayton)
Diana Hunn, Ph.D.
(Thesis Committee Member, University of Dayton)
ii
ABSTRACT
THE ORIGINS OF TECHNOLOGY IN EDUCATION: THE ROLE OF FEDERAL 
INTERVENTIONS AND NATIONAL EMERGENCIES DURING THE EARLY 
EVOLUTION OF INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND MEDIA, 1940 -1960
Name: J. Jose Cortez
University of Dayton, 2002
Advisor: Dr. Thomas C. Hunt
The purpose of this Master’s thesis is to explore, review, and describe 
known historical events and contexts that impacted, and gave impetus to, the 
evolution of technology in education. In doing so, this study historically traces 
two significant themes that are interwoven throughout the history of American 
education that have led to the introduction, and promoted the use, of early forms
of instructional technology and media in education: federal interventions in 
education and scientific research, especially during periods of wartime 
preparedness and postwar concerns about the status of America’s system of 
education; and the emergence of, gradual advances made in, and the
acceptance of instructional media and technology in the nation’s classrooms— 
particularly as a result of federal interventions during the yearsl 940-1960.
Prominent among the war preparedness events mentioned in the study
are the military and civilian wartime training programs and institutes, conducted
on college campuses and military installations. The need to rapidly train tens of
thousands of new military personnel, and civilian workers to support the war
production created a heightened interest in applying educational research in a
iii
systematic way and helped to propel forward systematic efforts to design 
instruction. During the early Cold War Years, federal legislation such as the
National Science Foundation Act of 1950 and National Defense Education Act of
1958, and subsequent amendments, paved the way for introducing more 
mechanical and electronic technology and teaching aids to facilitate science, 
mathematics, and language instruction. Through this legislation, education was 
called upon to support the national agenda of competition with the Soviet Union 
(following the successful launch of Sputnik) and to assist the nation in reclaiming 
its global leadership in science and technology.
Early instructional technology took the form of visual and audio teaching 
“aids” that were introduced during the advent of the visual and audiovisual
movements, as alternate methods to books and lectures to deliver information. It
was during this early period in the history of technology in education that 
filmstrips, motion pictures, audio recording, and radio were invented and used in
educational settings.
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Section I:
INTRODUCTION
The absence of romance from my history will, I fear, detract somewhat 
from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an
exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, 
which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it,
I shall be content. In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay which is 
to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time.
(Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Book I, 22)
Purpose and Rationale
The purpose of this Master’s thesis is to explore and review current 
literature and present relevant findings that identify and describe known historical
events and contexts that impacted, and gave impetus to, the evolution of
technology in education. In doing so, I am not concerned with the total sphere of 
education, nor the complete history of technology in education and instructional
theory; rather, my primary intent in this study is to historically trace two significant 
themes that are interwoven throughout the history of American education during 
the 1940-1960 period that led to the introduction, and promoted the use, of early 
forms of instructional technology and media in America’s classrooms:
2(1) Federal interventions in scientific research and educational
matters—particularly in higher education—during times of
national crises as education was called upon to support the
national agendas of wartime preparedness, manpower training,
competition with the Soviet Union, and reclaiming global 
leadership in science and technology: What were the significant
historical events that prompted federal intervention, in terms of
research sponsorship and funding of education? What role did
instructional technology and media play during periods of national 
crises in terms of military training and industrial manpower
preparedness? What events prompted the National Science
Foundation (NSF) Act of 1950 and the National Defense
Education Act (NDEA) of 1958? What were the influences and
outcomes from the aforementioned federal legislation that
impacted science and math education, and advances in the
utilization of new instructional technologies, materials, and
teaching aids in the classroom and in scientific and technical
training programs?
(2) The emergence of, and gradual advances made in, instructional
technology and media, and their contributions to facilitating
teaching and learning: What roles did the wartime preparedness,
industry workforce training, training in the sciences, and federal
3legislation play in the development of modern instructional 
methodologies? How did instructional technology—as visual
instruction, and later as audiovisual communications—in
education evolve in the United States?
In looking back in time, I am attempting to demonstrate the important roles 
that federal interventions in time of national crises and early innovations in 
instructional technology and media played in the development, introduction, and 
acceptance of instructional media and more modern mechanical and electronic
teaching aids in America’s classrooms.
Each section in the study begins with one or two paragraphs that I utilize 
to introduce the section’s theme or topic. Certain terms and phrases (e.g., higher 
education, Negroes, etc.) are used in the early portions of the study because 
their meaning and/or historical longevity was deemed as being more appropriate 
to the context or period in time where used in the study, or because they were 
utilized by sources listed in this study. This terminology gradually changed over 
time (e.g., postsecondary education, African-American, etc.), and the study
reflects the same.
Throughout the study, I use the terms “basic research” or “pure science,” 
often interchangeably. While there is little agreement on a precise definition, 
most scientists during the era covered by the study used these terms to refer to 
work that had no immediate practical application and thus it was distinct from
4“applied research.” Likewise, the terms “educational technology” and 
“instructional technology” are used interchangeably.
Audience
My intended audience involves students whose academic concentrations
are in the area of instructional technology. Also, teachers and researchers
specializing in the field of curriculum design and development, instructional
methodology, and educational technology will benefit from the study’s findings. It 
is my belief that educators should investigate and become aware of this history
as an important step in developing a personal perspective of the bigger picture of
technology in education, and the role that it has and can continue to play in 
learning environments. Hopefully, this study can help to develop a cognitive 
framework in the mind of readers through which one can view the past, today’s 
realities, and tomorrow’s potential for technology in education.
The Plan of this Study
Section II introduces readers to the general, historical background 
information pertinent to the major topics or themes of this study as they evolved
prior to World War II: early federal interventions in educational matters, the
status of the nation’s schools and institutions of higher education, scientific
research, and early instructional technologies and media. Each of these topics is
later expanded upon in subsequent sections of the study.
5The status of scientific research is described in terms of the establishment
of agricultural extension services at land grant universities, creation of the 
nation’s first research universities, the role of private and industry foundations in 
funding scientific research, and the efforts of the National Research Council 
during World War I. Previously, and as late as the early nineteenth century, 
scientific research was primarily undertaken in the domain of self-supporting 
amateurs, having little or no contact with industry, academia, and the federal
government.
The earliest view of educational technology and one that continues to this 
day is that of technology as media and audiovisual communications, which grew 
out of the visual education movement during the early nineteenth century, visual 
instruction movement beginning in 1918, and the audiovisual movement that 
began in the 1930s—all as alternate methods to books and lectures to deliver
information. Classroom “apparatuses” and “aids” are introduced as early forms of
instructional media during the advent of the visual education movement. Visual
education, as a movement, has its roots in the efforts of reformist educators and
theorists, and later American progressive educators, who revolted against
formalism and verbalism in educational practice during the nineteenth and early
twentieth century and sought to emphasis the role of the senses in learning. In
1918, the movement evolved into visual instruction, as the use of aids in the
classroom gained momentum. It was during this early period in the history of
technology in education that filmstrips, motion pictures, audio recording, and
radio were invented and used in educational settings.
6Section III discusses war preparedness training and the role of scientific
research and audiovisual media. Prominent among the war preparedness events
and training institutions mentioned in this section are the role of military and 
civilian wartime training programs conducted on college campuses; the U.S.
Office of Education’s Division of Visual Aids for War Training, and its efforts in
both industrial and military training programs; and, the United States Armed 
Forces Institute, which offered training and correspondence courses to military
personnel. War preparedness and wartime training made extensive use of the 
emerging instructional technologies and media of that era, and propelled the
evolution of instructional media from the visual instruction movement—leading to
the emergence of the new audiovisual communications movement.
This section also describes the role of private foundations and their
support of pre- and wartime research—particularly the origins of the National 
Science Foundation (NSF), beginning with the first of its predecessor
organizations, the National Defense Research Committee, as one of the earliest
concrete attempts to centralize organization and control of scientific research in
the United States. During World War II, first the National Defense Research
Committee, and later the Office of Scientific Research and Development,
provided direction for research and the development of the nation’s military
technologies.
Section IV addresses the topic of postwar interventions in higher
education and science by the federal government. The section begins with a
discussion of the passage of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, which
7is mentioned within the context of the changes it brought to college campuses 
and the need for new classroom and laboratory facilities. The instructional 
research efforts during the war contributed to the growth of standardized testing
(a form of instructional assessment and evaluation); and, subsequent federal 
intervention and impacts in education following World War II. Also, the period 
covered by this section witnessed the establishment of the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) in 1950, and key national and international events that 
preceded passage of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958.
Section V describes the social and political debates over the effectiveness 
of American education, and the national politics of federal aid to education. 
Education was called upon to support the national agenda of competition with 
the Soviet Union following the successful launch of Sputnik, and to assist the 
nation in reclaiming its global leadership in science and technology. The primary 
focus of this section is legislation that gradually increased federal involvement in
education and established the precedent for more general, as opposed to
categorical, forms of federal aid. The NSF Act and the NDEA established
scholarships and fellowships, and provided aid for new programs in specific
fields of study; both eventually became a significant source of funding to
university faculty and students for basic and applied research. More importantly,
for the purposes of this study, the NDEA and subsequent amendments to the
original legislation led to the introduction of more modern mechanical and
electronic teaching aids in education.
8Section VI completes the discussion concerning instructional technology
as it evolved as media and audiovisual communications, during the time frame
when television emerged as a mass communications and instructional media.
Leaders of the visual instruction movement became uneasy about the adequacy 
of the visual instruction label as the newer technologies such as audio recordings 
and radio enter into the equation. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, a
second approach—technology in education as instructional systems— began to 
take root and is described briefly in this section. This approach emphasized a 
system’s or programmed instruction approach to utilizing instructional technology 
in education and was an outgrowth of the systematic approaches used in the 
military and in business data processing of that time period.
The concluding section—Section VII—examines the historical contexts of
the origins of federal interventions in education and scientific research and the
early evolution of technology in education, in light of the events of the time.
Likewise, my reflections are expressed regarding the events described in this 
study and their importance to the development of instructional technology and
media.
9Section II:
EARLY FEDERAL INTERVENTIONS IN EDUCATION AND 
SCIENCE, AND THE ADVENT OF VISUAL INSTRUCTION
The Constitution of the United States does not include a provision that
directs the federal government to provide for the education of its citizens. Even 
so, throughout our nation’s history one can note events, legislation, and other 
evidence of a gradual and significant federal involvement in educational matters. 
The national welfare, defense of the nation, and racial desegregation, among
others, have been issues that provided legislators and presidents with rationale
for federal intervention and financial aid.
Early Federal Legislation Supporting Education
“From the beginning of our country the role of federal government in
education has never been clear. Even though education began as a local
responsibility and concern, and became a state responsibility, the federal 
government has provided support for education almost since the birth of the
nation” (Harden, 1981, p. 4).
Among the well-known examples of federal involvement in education,
cited by Kaestle and Smith (1982), that occurred before 1940 are the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, the Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890, the Smith-Hughes Act of
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1917, and several of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal programs that affected 
public schools. “Federal involvement in pre-collegiate education began long 
before 1940, and its history since then is complex” (p. 385).
The practice of land grants—endowments given to the states for
educational purposes—was not novel in American history. Instead, the
precedents are numerous and longstanding since the colonies received this 
heritage from the English Crown. As the states replaced colonies, they continued 
the practice of giving land grants for higher education. It was, however, the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 that “led to the practice of giving each newly 
admitted state (unless carved out of the original thirteen) two entire townships for 
a ‘seminary of learning’” (E. L. Johnson, 1997, p.223).
The Ordinance stated that “schools and means foreducation shall forever
be encouraged” (Harden, 1981, p. 4). The intent was to set aside a"plot in each 
township and use the proceeds from the rental of that land to support common
schools. “The fact that the law did not work is seldom noted in educational
histories. The effect of the Northwest Ordinance on common schooling was
almost nil. Land-based school funding could not work in an area where
unimproved land was plentiful and almost as worthless as rental property....The
development of income-generating state school funds was not a high priority in
the frontier Midwest” (Kaestle and Smith, 1982, p. 387). Nevertheless, this
Ordinance did become the first national grant for the support of higher education
(Hamilton and Laufer, 1975).
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The Morrill Land-Grant Acts of 1862 and 1890 represented the next 
federal venture into education designed to affect higher education (Kaestle and 
Smith, 1985). Introduced in 1859, Morrill’s first land-grant legislation was vetoed 
by President Buchanan, who questioned its constitutionality—though it was 
alleged he feared the land grant issue. “During the Buchanan years, there was a 
division between the Eastern and Western States regarding the sale of public 
lands. The Western States opposed the sale of public lands because they feared 
it would lead to speculation. Under the proposed Morrill Act, the Eastern States, 
which no longer had any available public land, were to receive money for 
available lands in the newer states. Thus, benefits from public lands in the West
would have been extended to institutions in the older Eastern States” (Hamilton
and Laufer, 1975, p. 5).
The passage of the Morrill Land-Grant Act of 1862, during the outbreak of 
the Civil War, is especially significant in that it is generally regarded as the first 
direct involvement in education by the federal government in the history of the 
United States. The Morrill Act encouraged the expansion of higher education by 
the establishment and support of land-grant colleges and universities for science, 
agriculture, engineering, and the mechanical arts. Its passage is fascinating and 
worth mentioning, given the fact its impact is still significant today for education 
in general and all land grant institutions in particular: “It introduced the idea of 
public service to the missions of higher education; it emphasized expanded 
access to higher education; and, it began federal support of agricultural
research” (Kerr, 1994, p. 31).
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The passage of the first Morrill Act, according to Hamilton and Laufer 
(1975), is significant for several other reasons: (1) It brought into practice the 
federal policy of categorical grants for higher education—providing for the 
‘general welfare’ in strengthening manpower development in certain fields; (2) 
the act encouraged agriculture, the mechanical arts, and military training in the 
new land grant colleges. Therefore, it is interesting to note that the first major 
federal program in support of higher education is also one that encouraged the 
participation of higher education in the nation’s defense. It was followed, in 1867, 
by the creation of a Department of Education. “Legislation affecting higher 
education did not conclude with the Morrill Act of 1862; rather, the precedent 
was established for future federal involvement” (p. 6-7).
The year 1890 brought the passage of a second Morrill Act. It was 
significant in that Congress adopted a policy of annual appropriations to land 
grant institutions, delimited the purposes for which funds could be used, and 
doubled their size (Hamilton and Laufer, 1975).
Land grant universities were intended to support research of use to 
farmers and the rural population. Passage of the Morrill Acts occurred within a 
socio-political environment that was characterized by a growing dissatisfaction 
with higher education and the emergence of agricultural organizations devoted to 
advancing the interests of farmers. In 1887, the land grant legislation was 
strengthened by the passage of the Hatch Act, which provided federal support 
for the establishment of agricultural experiment stations and a “context for the
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systematic application of scientific research to agricultural problems” (Kleinman,
1995, p. 28-29).
Previously, the federal government had little connection to, or involvement
with, scientific research. A strict interpretation of the Constitution had the effect of
limiting government involvement in science to the granting of patents. However,
the government did support some topographical research to benefit commerce
and the military. In the early nineteenth century, there was an expansion of the
Coast Survey and government research to develop charts and maps for use by
commercial interests; and, in 1803, the federal government sponsored the Lewis
and Clark expedition. Later, the Civil War led to increased government activities
in support of research—such as funds to improve naval armaments, ships,
steam engineering; and, other military technologies for both the Army and Navy.
A major science-related development during the Civil War was the creation in
1863 of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), chartered as an organization 
for consultation to government in scientific and military matters during the war
and recognized by some in the science community as an attempt by prominent 
scientists in the U. S. to centralize control over American science (Kleinman,
1995).
After the Civil War, Congress created the Allison Commission to
investigate existing science agencies in light of growing criticism on Capital Hill
regarding the ineffectiveness and inappropriateness of much government-
supported research. This commission asked the NAS to undertake this
investigation, develop a study, and determine the feasibility of creating a single
14
agency or department of science to undertake research not conducted in 
universities or by the private sector. While the Academy’s report, submitted in
1886, favored the creation of such an agency or department, “the commission
decided against promoting a department of science on the grounds that it was 
not in the national interest and was not politically feasible” (Kleinman, 1995, p.
48).
The next major milestone in terms of federal intervention in higher
education matters was in 1914, with the passage of the Smith-Lever Act. It 
provided matching funds for extension services to benefit the agricultural 
segments of the country, in the areas of agriculture and home economics—
curricula and services offered by land grant universities. Moreover, the outbreak
of the First World War in Europe this same year brought the federal government
and higher education into closer proximity with the passage, in 1916, of the
National Defense Act. This act was passed to establish the Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC) at four-year universities to qualify students for leadership 
position in the military during national emergencies (Hamilton and Laufer, 1975).
An important element of the National Defense Act was that it was a result
of an overall preparedness movement begun in 1914 that advocated military
discipline and training in non-military settings as a character building tool, and
this was especially reflected in Section 27 of the Act, which called for soldiers to
receive both military training and education to prepare for jobs in civilian life. The
programs were to be voluntary. Although the Corps was disbanded in 1918, the
15
Act was amended in 1920 calling for its reestablishment (Stubblefield and
Keane, 1994).
The Nation’s Schools and Federal Aid Prior to World War II
Legislation impacting elementary and secondary schooling did not occur
until World War I. In 1917, the year the U. S. entered World War I, the Smith-
Hughes Vocational Education Act provided federal categorical aid to public
secondary schools for vocational education programs governed by very specific
structural agreements. Where the Morrill Act of 1862 had provided for technical
education in the land grant colleges, this new legislation sought to introduce its
counterpart in the public secondary schools (Krug, 1966). According to Kaestle
and Smith (1982): “This legislation, and subsequent Congressional measures,
supported local vocational programs, despite the absence of evidence that such
programs actually resulted in effective vocational placement....The coming of
World War I served to hasten an already existing successful reform movement to 
achieve federal funds for vocational education. Industrial training was a part of
President Woodrow Wilson’s preparedness program, but the 1917 bill was a
faithful embodiment of the recommendations of the National Commission on
Vocational Education, appointed in 1913” (p. 388-391). The bill gave vocational
educational its first real impetus through support for home economics,
agriculture, trade, and industrial education (Harden, 1981).
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The Smith-Hughes Act, likewise, is significant from the perspective that it 
is one of many examples of educational legislation that were influenced by
factors and events outside of education—in this case, World War I. A demand for
action surfaced and brought about passage of this legislation when draft boards
discovered that close to 25% of the draftees were illiterate, many did not speak
English, and the great majority of the one-third of the inductees who were 
deemed physically unfit suffered from defects that could have been detected and
remedied at school age (Munger and Fenno, 1962).
Krug (1966) lists several arguments that prompted interest in the passage
of the Smith-Hughes Act: “the decline of apprenticeship, the presence of many
pupils who allegedly had neither interest in nor talent for the academic program,
the need for trained workers to keep the United Sates abreast of other industrial
nations...and the need for economic growth” (Krug, 1966, p. 112). Other
important contributing factors included the decline of a teen-age labor force, it
came during a profound expansion of secondary school enrollments, and the
desire of legislators and educators to utilize vocational education as a means to
differentiate curricula—a form of equal opportunity, based on the notion that high
schools could serve all youth only by offering a variety of curricula (Kaestle and
Smith, 1982). Despite the concerns of those who questioned the separate
curricular tracks as class bias, according to Urban and Wagoner (2000), support
for differentiated studies came from all classes: “For example, many in the
organized labor movement and from the working and lower classes saw
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vocational studies as a recognition of the dignity and honor of their own way of
life” (p. 212).
“The broad ideological and technological appeal of vocational education 
allowed it to survive as the only pre-World War II categorical federal aid program 
to elementary and secondary education despite periodic commission reports 
demonstrating that it was ineffective. Smith-Hughes was the major precedent for 
the federal government’s categorical initiatives in 1958” (Kaestle and Smith,
1982, p. 388).
Following World War I, Congress passed the Vocational Rehabilitation Act 
of 1918, which provided aid to train veterans who were unable to find 
employment. A year later, educational institutions received war surplus in the 
form of military property, and the establishment of special collegiate programs for
disabled veterans (Hamilton and Laufer, 1975).
During the 1930s, the United States was continuing its efforts, as a nation, 
to recover from the Great Depression. While there were several short-lived
upturns during 1930s—partially as a result of the unprecedented efforts of 
Franklin Roosevelt’s administration—there were also several significant 
downturns. According to Bennett (1996), by 1929, “the flappers’ party was over,
and by 1932 only one in four men had a job. Economic necessity forced all too 
many students to disappear from the classroom as soon as they got into long 
pants or started using bobby pins” (p. 6). By the time Franklin Roosevelt took
office, America’s schools, like other segments of the economy, had taken a
severe beating and were financially under siege. Some schools, mostly in rural
18
areas of the country, were forced to close, and almost all school districts were
forced to reduce their budgets often by as much as one-third, cutting deeply into
teacher staffing and salaries (Fass, 1986). Urban and Wagoner (2000) add:
The economy grew in fits and starts and never completely shook off the
effects of the stock market collapse of 1929. It is now the general
consensus among historians and economists, that it was the arrival of
World War II and the conversion to a full-employment war economy that
convincingly ended the decade-long Great Depression...despite the
upheavals in the economy and the cutbacks that took place in the
educational community during the depression years, schooling itself
continued to follow the familiar patterns of the 1920s. (p. 279)
During this period the federal government’s relative absence from direct
involvement in educational matters was curtailed, following a long history of
federal quiescence in which educational matters and funding rested with the
states, local school districts, and private schools. The reform activities that
President Roosevelt initiated to cope with the economic and social devastations
of the Great Depression were not only unprecedented in many ways, but also
marked the beginning of more active and direct federal intervention in education
that was a critical ingredient in New Deal legislation (Fass, 1986).
According to Hamilton and Laufer (1975), often the agencies and
programs that were created to employ the unemployed also sponsored
educational programs designed to supplement the established local education
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systems. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) supported the
various educational programs although education was not its primary focus. One 
such educational program was the College Student Work Program, given the 
FERA’s concern over the effects of the Great Depression on college enrollments. 
It is estimated that 1500 out of the 1700 colleges eligible participated in the 
program, benefiting approximately 620 thousand students—though “many of the 
jobs that college students found themselves working on were not related to their 
academic interests and were indeed menial in nature” (p. 13).
During the aforementioned time period, another federally-funded program 
involved payments to 40,000 teachers who taught in adult education or rural 
schools. Likewise, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, as a result of an 
amendment passed by the 72nd Congress, was allowed to make federal loans to 
states and municipalities for educational purposes. These loans assisted 
colleges and universities in areas of capital improvements and related outlays 
(Munger and Fenno, 1962).
The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and the National Youth 
Administration (NYA) were two of the most famous of the New Deal work relief
programs that established significant educational components. The first of these 
two agencies, the CCC, began in 1933 as a public works program that housed 
unemployed, unmarried male youth between the ages of eighteen and twenty- 
five. On the average CCC enrollees had completed either eight or ninth grade in 
school, though many had dropped out of school and came from broken homes.
They were housed in rural camp settings, run according to quasi-military routines
20
that placed emphasis on basic literacy skills, moral training, and developing
values of hard work and disciple. It was the mission of the CCC— controlled by 
the Army and assisted by the Forest Service and the National Park Service—to
preserve the nation’s forests and other natural resources (Stubblefield and
Keane, 1994). Educational activities in CCC settings grew out of a need to 
provide recruits with constructive activities during their off-work hours (Urban and 
Wagoner, 2000).
On the other hand, the NYA was a non-residential program, centered 
primarily in towns and cities, that provided direct aid payments to current high 
school and college youth for doing various types of jobs—usually at school sites; 
and, developed job and training programs for youth already out of school (Urban 
and Wagoner, 2000). The program, part of the Works Progress Administration 
(WPA), enrolled 2,677,000 young people, of which 45 percent were female 
(Stubblefield and Keane, 1994).
Soon after America entered World War II in 1941, New Deal educational
programs were dismantled; the CCC in 1942, and the WPA and NYA in 1943.
Both the CCC and NYA provided training for the war, but enrollment had 
dropped as young men entered the military or were employed by defense 
industries (Stubblefield and Keane, 1994).
The George-Deen Act of 1936 was passed to replace the George-Elizey 
Act of 1934, both of which provided funds to vocational education that originated 
with the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917. The George-Deen Act was later replaced, in
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1946, by the George-Barden Act. It, too, authorized additional money for
vocational education (Harden, 1981).
The Lanham Act of 1939 is among the emergency school aid measures 
passed by the 76th Congress toward the end of the Great Depression. This 
legislation provided funds for school districts in areas sharply affected by federal
activities and was administered by the Federal Works Agency (Munger and 
Fenno, 1962). The Act, a predecessor of the federally impact legislation of the
1950s, was important in that it provided funds to compensate communities for 
domestic federal ownership of land for installations, such as military bases, that 
sent children to local schools, but were exempted from paying property taxes. 
This Act was expanded by legislation in 1950, the year that the Korean Conflict 
began. Otherwise, most federal education programs during the depression and 
war years were for manpower training in non-school or higher education settings
(Kaestle and Smith, 1982).
The New Deal altered beliefs and perspectives about the role of the 
federal government, provided the origins for the idea of education as an
entitlement, and effected federal intervention in education on the behalf of racial
and other educationally deprived groups. “In this sense, the New Deal
anticipated the educational developments of the post-1960s period...” (Fass, 
1986, p. 22). While the New Deal, as the federal government’s primary response 
to the Great Depression, significantly changed the relationship of the federal 
government to education, it did so in ’"ironic and problematic ways” (Fass, p.
23)— Roosevelt did not have a policy of equality, nor did he challenge
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segregation in school systems and CCC programs. The educational programs of
the New Deal were not anchored in long-term commitment, as Roosevelt never
intended to usurp the traditional principle of local control of schooling, and he did
not support general federal aid to education (Fass, 1986).
Changes Brewing in Higher Education
Though most economic aspects of American life suffered during the Great
Depression, “higher education benefited somewhat from the fact that few young
people could find jobs, and, therefore, attended colleges and universities in 
greater numbers” (Hamilton and Laufer, 1975). Nevertheless, changes in higher 
education had been slow in evolving prior to the war. Although higher education 
had begun to play a more prominent role in American life during the interwar 
period, colleges and universities remained the citadels of the upper-middle class 
and retain its overwhelming association with the genteel elite (Clark, 1998).
Moreover, in the 1940s, “almost no one in America, any more than in 
Europe, believed that a college education should be available to everyone who 
wanted it and was willing to work for it” (Bonner, 1986, p. 44). College was only 
for those who were properly prepared for it, or had the money to attend. Many 
Americans were ambivalent toward higher education, given that attendance at
college was associated with the consumption of the upper-middle class—
something aspired to by some but often resented or dismissed as frivolous and
of no practical value (Clark, 1998).
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Nationwide, less than a million and a half students—predominately male
(approximately 60 percent) and overwhelmingly white (97 percent), largely from 
middle and upper income families—attended colleges and universities in 1940. 
Therefore, colleges and universities, prior to the war, were basically elitist 
institutions serving only the very few, charging tuition only the middle and upper
classes could afford, and discriminated against women, Negroes and the poor.
Very little was expected of higher education in terms of change, broadening
opportunities, or improving the quality of life through research. “Furthermore, no 
one seemed to care....This elite group had been carefully screened, and they 
overwhelmingly chose to study the liberal arts or one of the tradition professions. 
Higher education...was supported almost wholly by student tuition and state 
government...except for the relief given poor students by the National Youth
Administration” (Bonner, 1986, p. 45).
Nonetheless, changes were brewing in higher education. Once fortresses
of privilege and emblems of wealth, with only the few able to contemplate study
beyond secondary education, the academies gradually began to open their doors
to a growing proportion of the population. “In the decade before World War II,
Jews were admitted one by one, and one was too many; blacks were rarely let in
the door and, in many elite campuses, women as well. There was a near­
exclusion of Catholics, who were stigmatized as people who believed everything
the Pope told them to believe and therefore incapable of scholarship” (Neusner
and Neusner, 1995, p. 31). Bonner (1986) adds:
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The higher education establishment’s credo in 1940 was rooted in early
modern Europe, heavily influenced by Protestant denominationalism, and
had ridden West with the freer social climate of the frontier. Then,
permanently changed by the German research university concept and
land grant acts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
American university became an amalgam of the German graduate school
uneasily joined to the English residential college for the benefit of
American students, (p. 44)
Viewing this change from the perspective of Neusner and Neusner (1995): 
“Heirs of the academic riches of Middle Europe...American universities remade 
themselves. American disciples then transcended their Middle European
masters, the men and women of reason revolted by Germany’s descent into 
racism and irrationality, who, en masse, formed the first large body of great 
scholarship to root itself on our shores, then enriching an already lavish but 
deeply local intellectual heritage of our own” (p. 21).
The Evolution of the American Research University
Typically, historians date the origins of the American research university 
as following the Civil War. According to Neusner and Neusner (1995), 
“scholarship was not necessarily wedded to the university. Good work took place 
wherever it happened, and no one assumed—in Europe or, surely, in the United
States—that the great work in science and humanities would come from the
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campus” (p. 39). The authors also noted that many of the greatest ideas of the
nineteenth century came from outsiders to the academy: a Viennese doctor,
Sigmund Freud; a Swiss bureaucrat, Albert Einstein; and, a German journalist,
Karl Marx. However, the idea of a casual scholar was gradually giving way to the 
ideal of an institution of scholarship, a legacy whose origins began with the
nineteenth century German universities (Neusner and Neusner, 1995).
Prior to the nineteenth century, higher education in the United States
focused on general, culture and the classics, rather than specialized education. 
Professors were generally teachers, not researchers. It was not until the late 
1860s and 1870s that the genesis of research-based graduate studies occurred: 
In the late 1860s, Josiah Willard Gibbs, the first internationally recognized 
American theoretical scientist since Benjamin Franklin, was awarded a doctorate 
by Yale University, an institution that led the way in establishing the research 
model of graduate level education. Fifteen years later, the founding of Johns 
Hopkins University marked the creation of the modern research university and 
original investigations by faculty were encouraged. It was modeled, in part, on 
the great universities of Europe, where American students went to German
universities to acquire advance education and research that was not available at
universities in the United States. In 1902, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) developed close links with the American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company, which provided regular research support; and, in 1908, MIT 
created the Research Laboratory of Applied Chemistry, becoming the first
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academic entity that was dedicated to performing research for industry 
(Kleinman, 1995).
The evolution of the scientific research and the modern American
research university represent key events during the 1940-1960 period: Kleinman
(1995) states that as late as the early nineteenth century, scientific research was
primarily undertaken in the domain of self-supporting amateurs, having little or no 
contact with industry, academia, foundations, and the federal government. By
the middle of the century, the technical means of discovery and production of 
scientific knowledge increasingly outgrew the capacity and control of individual 
scientists, and from this perspective compelled organization and increased 
controls. Scientists became more dependent on external sources of support; 
laboratory methods gradually replaced the existing methodology of the times, 
and the scientists themselves moved from independent laboratories to
universities, private industry, and government laboratories.
Neusner and Neusner (1995) argue that a growing social acceptance of
the purpose and meaning of higher education contributed to the evolution of the
modern research university. State universities, in particular, devoted themselves
to particular goals: “In research, this meant an expansion of scholarship in
emerging or ignored areas. In teaching, this meant emphasizing relevant and
practical matters over theoretical ones” (p. 41). Before World War II, research
hardly defined the vocation of higher education in the United States, and even
large universities had placed only marginal value upon faculty research and
publication (Neusner and Neusner, 1995).
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It was during 1940s that “the American university came of age....Still in 
the thrall of European learning after World War I in most major fields, American 
scientists and scholars had established themselves at the frontiers of knowledge 
in virtually all fields by the eve of World War II. This accomplishment essentially
took place within the universities, where research and graduate education were
expanded in scope and made more rigorous in character” (Geiger, 1997, p. 278-
279). The first all-electronic digital computer, for example, was developed at
Iowa State University, a land grant university, in 1939 by John Atanasoff and 
Clifford Berry (Newby, Stepich, Lehman, and Russell, 2000). The university in 
the U. S. had become “a place where scientists could develop their cultural
capital, and the value of this capital became clear to those outside the university 
when university scientists helped developed technologies used in the war” 
(Kleinman, 1995, p. 27).
Teaching Apparatuses, Visual Aids,
And the Origins of the Visual Education
As early as 1830, educators began to recognize that new teaching
apparatuses could make invaluable contributions to the educational field.
Reformers like Mann and Barnard began to require their schools (in 
Massachusetts and Connecticut, respectively) to report regularly on apparatuses 
acquired and their use. In fact, in his Second Annual report as Secretary of the 
Board of Commissioners of Commons Schools in his state, Henry Barnard was
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critical of his state for not utilizing teaching apparatuses more effectively
(Anderson, 1961).
Although the terms visual education and visual instruction did not evolve
until about 1906, many developments and trends were already crystallizing into a
distinctly new movement in American education (Saettler, 1990). Prior to the Civil
War, the most common educational apparatuses used were timepieces, maps
and globes, slates and blackboards, textbooks, and the abacus or numeral
frames. “Most of these apparatuses were extremely simple and required very 
little engineering in their manufacture. And, though there was knowledge as to 
the existence of these items, very few found their way into the average school of
the times” (Anderson, 1961, p.19).
Visual apparatuses or aids, in terms of their first role in elementary and
secondary schools also included field trips to museums—serving as aids for
teachers, both inside and outside of the classroom. Such aids included museum
exhibits, charts, photographs, illustrations, lantern slides, and maps (Heinich,
Molenda, and Russell, 1989). “In America, museums were one of the most
significant early influences on instructional media. While this might seem odd,
museums have a long history of cooperating with schools and assuring a clear
instructional role in their communities” (Newby et al., 2000, p. 317).
This situation gradually improved following the Civil War and the
emergence of industrialization across the nation, though the unprecedented
technological advances of that era had little impact on education. “Few new
instructional implements were introduced. It was mainly a period of polishing and
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streamlining what already existed, though mass production methods did lower 
prices and extend the benefits of existing apparatuses to more areas”
(Anderson, 1961, p. 34). During the post-Civil War period, there was a flood of
educational publications in the form of journals, reviews, and weeklies.
Moreover, states began to publish their own educational journals to keep
teachers informed. All contained articles and advertisements from the school
furniture and apparatus companies: “Their enticing illustrations and glowing sales
claims probably went far in persuading teachers that the newest in educational
apparatus was a basic necessity" (Anderson, 1961, p. 35-6).
As early as 1886, the education department of the State of New York had
begun, through legislative appropriations of $50,000—a considerable sum at that
time—to encourage the concept of visual education in schools throughout the
state (Saettler, 1990). In 1904, New York State organized the first visual
instruction department, which was responsible for collecting and distributing
lantern slides to school districts throughout the state (Newby et al., 2000).
Opposition to new educational apparatuses revolved around issues such
as the perception that they were too complicated, nightmares of schools being
converted into educational factories where the teacher would be little more than
a mechanic manipulating the apparatuses, or that the apparatuses were used
more for showmanship, status, or prestige symbols by schools rather than as
implements for teaching (Anderson, 1961).
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Nevertheless, many had begun to see inherent instructional value in the
new media that were becoming available. Saettler (1990) categorizes media
advocates of this era into two groups:
One composed of social workers and a few imaginative educators; the
other consisted of commercial producers and distributors of such new
visual media as stereographs, lantern slides, maps, models, slidefilms,
and motion picture films, who envisioned an extended market for their
wares. It was easy to see why the commercial promoters soon christened
this new movement ‘visual education.’ The name was formally declared in
1906, when the Keystone View Company of Meadville, Pennsylvania,
published Visual Education, a teacher’s guide to Keystone’s 600 Set of
stereographs and lantern slides, (p. 123)
The Advent of Film and the Visual Instruction and Audiovisual Movements
The film industry began in Chicago, in 1907, when Albert S. Howell, a 
farmer boy from Michigan who had studied engineering at night, and Donald H.
Bell, a movie projectionist, developed one of the first precision film projectors.
The Bell & Howell Company designed and built complete systems of
photographic equipment that vastly improved upon the popular nickelodeon films
and corrected many of the technical flaws for which the early movies had been
dubbed ‘flickers.’ The company also solved another industry-wide problem:
standardization. Previously there existed a variety of films sizes; each
manufacturer produced equipment in customized sizes. Bell & Howell
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standardized their equipment to the 35mm size, coordinating this standard
across their line of projectors, perforator, and printing equipment. This
coordination found wide favor in Hollywood, which by 1920 all movie studios
accepted the 35mm as the movie industry’s standard (Dent, 1969).
The first films for instructional uses were usually theatrical films for
general purpose or entertainment interest. Later, in the 1920s as the motion 
picture industry began to expand, it was thought that theatrical films had
educational value as well. Otherwise, most instructional films at the time of World
War I and afterwards were for industrial, government, and military training. The
earliest forms of educational film were the newsreel, travelogues, and scientific
motion pictures. “News events and foreign expeditions began to be filmed and
travel films were used on lyceum circuits” (Saettler, 1990, p. 96). One of the
earliest non-theatrical film companies was Atlas Educational Films, organized in
Oak Park, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago, in 1913. The company produced
historical motion pictures and launched the Atlas Education Weekly, the 
forerunners of later documentary films shown in leading movie theaters across
the country. In 1912, Herman A DeVry introduced the first DeVry suitcase 35mm
motion picture projector. The Victor Animatograph Company, of Davenport, Iowa, 
introduced a similar product that same year (Dent, 1969).
The use of film in education was brought about by the success and
popularity of illustrated lectures on the Lyceum and Chautauqua lectures circuit,
and the impetus provided by the effectiveness and extensive use of training films
during World War I. An important figure on the lectures circuit at this time was
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Elias Burton Holmes, who made two significant contributions to the visual 
education movement: First, he was an important figure who popularized 
illustrated lectures and, second, he created the largest and most valuable early 
source of films that could be successfully used in the classroom. “The adult
education movement of this era was an important aspect of the American
intellectual life and established the mold of academic respectability for the visual
instruction movement” (Saettler, 1990, p. 123-124).
As educators gradually began to recognize the significance of instructional 
films, an important new movement in American education—known at that time as
visual instruction—first developed from the mainstream of instructional
technology during the period of 1918-1924. During this time frame, the first
formal credit courses in visual instruction were offered for teachers at the college
and university level, visual instruction journals and professional organizations
appeared, and the first systematic visual instruction research studies were
reported (Saettler, 1968).
The first school use of motion pictures was in 1910 in the City of
Rochester (NY) public schools, where the school board adopted films for regular 
instructional use (Newby et al., 2000). In 1917, the Chicago school system
organized a visual education department; and, in the years following World War
I, other large school systems established similar department or bureaus.
“Classroom use of films became a symbol of progressive teaching practices, just
as the microcomputer is today. In the 1920s and 1930s, the black window
shades, silver screen, and 16mm projector lent an aura of modernity and
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innovation to classrooms” (Cuban, 1986, p. 12). “Like other media at the time,
instructional films were considered aids to teaching rather than self-contained 
sequences of instruction” (Heinich et al., 1989, p. 18).
In the city school systems, visual instruction usually progressed in three
distinct phases: (1) the school museum, (2) organization of slide libraries, and (3)
the establishment of film libraries (Saettler, 1990). Almost since the introduction
of the visual aids, state agencies established separate visual instruction divisions
to support the state-wide use of visual film, publish visual instruction materials, 
and served as lending libraries for visual materials and a resource for training 
teachers and administrators. Likewise, university extension divisions offered on­
site and correspondence courses and in-service training, sponsored 
conferences, and published texts and materials in audiovisual education (p.
144). “Some higher education instructors proposed that media such as slides
and film delivered information in more concrete, and therefore more effective,
ways” (Roblyer and Edwards, 2000, p. 6).
The first official credit course in visual instruction was offered at the
University of Minnesota in 1918. Other courses were later established at the
University of Kansas and North Carolina State University Teachers College in
1921 (Saettler, 1990). Among the prominent educators to stress the need for
incorporating visual instruction in teacher education programs was F. Dean 
McClusky, director of visual education for Pennsylvania. McClusky urged that 
teachers be given an opportunity to learn the advantages and disadvantages of
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visual instruction through formal and informal training, and that such courses of 
study should be introduced into normal schools (Saettler, 1968).
“Much of the theorizing behind the methodology of film use was based on 
the concept that the pictorial is inevitably real, concrete, and meaningful; that is, 
the film medium not only brought visual reality but added concreteness through 
the quality of motion” (Saettler, 1968, p. 118). Film was a medium for “breathing 
reality into the spoken and printed word that stirred emotions and interest while 
taking up far less instructional time...” (Cuban, 1986, p. 11).
According to Dent (1969), Thomas Edison was reported to have predicted 
that the motion pictures would one day take the place of most books below the 
ninth grade. However, Otis W. Caldwell, of Columbia University, differed with 
Edison’s expectation in an article published in the very first edition (January 
1920) of SVE’s new magazine, Visual Education:
The relationship of visual instruction to reading is fundamental....Motion 
pictures concerning travel, industry, manufacture, and social and civic 
situations can stimulate a student’s interpretation and understanding of 
things that are read. Proper visual instruction, therefore, both encourages 
the use of reading and enhances the intellectual aspects of reading, (p.
22)
Caldwell also expressed a curriculum-coordinated approach to using films 
in education: “It must be clear that motion pictures will not serve their proper use
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in schools unless they are selected and organized with direct reference to the 
subjects of the curriculum” (p. 24).
At the beginning of World War I, a Committee on Public Information was 
organized to disseminate information concerning the war activities of the 
government. During the war, the War and Navy Departments had organized film 
divisions for the two-fold purpose of supplying informational films to the public
and of instructing officers and men in the science of war (Saettler, 1990).
In 1919, the Society for Visual Education (SVE) was created, following 
months of planning under the leadership of Dr. Forest Ray Moulton, of the 
University of Chicago. It was backed by Dr. Harry Pratt Judson, the University’s 
president, “who was eager to extend the school’s educational facilities to 
activities that would improve instruction in the schools” (Dent, 1969). In 1923, the 
National Education Association (NEA) established its Department of Visual 
Instruction. This department later, in a merger in 1931, incorporated the two 
existing national visual instruction organizations—the National Academy of 
Visual Instruction and the Visual Instruction Association (Saettler, 1968). After
its reorganization in 1988 as an independent entity, it became the Association for
Educational Communications and Technology (Roblyer and Edwards, 2000).
The name change was intended to reflect the evolution of the field from visual
education to educational technology (AECT, 1977).
Among the factors Saettler (1968) lists as contributing to the emergence
of the visual instruction movement include:
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• The long tradition of revolt against formalism and verbalism in
educational practice as reflected in the work of men like Comenius,
Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, Herbart, and Dewey.
• A growing realization that current instructional practices were
inadequate to meet the needs of increased school enrollments.
• The subsequent conviction that film was destined to revolutionize
educational practice and it would simultaneously reduce the costs
of instruction.
• The success and popularity of illustrated lectures on the Lyceum 
and Chautauqua circuits convinced many educators that this same
instructional technique could be used in the classroom.
• The extensive and effective use of training films during World War I
gave an impetus to the new movement, (p. 120)
During the 1920s, teachers were beginning to carry larger teaching loads 
and, in many instances, had grown dissatisfied with older teaching methods— 
seeing them as slow, ineffective, and often wasteful. As a result, many educators 
gradually became receptive to the faster, more direct teaching process provided
by instructional motion pictures. On the other hand, there were the teachers who
had misgivings about this new technology and feared that motion pictures would 
bring commercialization into the classroom (Dent, 1969).
The costs associated with visual equipment was another issue: schools 
had begun to complain that the high cost of projectors had become prohibitive to
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the use of motion pictures for teaching purchases. This led to the development of 
the lower cost, and less bulky, Sellograph filmstrip projector. In 1923, the 
Sellograph was, in turn, updated by the Arto. Both the Sellograph and the Arto 
projected still pictures advanced manually from 35mm filmstrips, later called
‘Picturols,’ one frame at a time. The Arto, however, differed in that it was
equipped with a heat filter located between the lamp and the filmstrip, which
allowed each picture to remain on the screen indefinitely without damage from
the lamp’s heat (Dent, 1969).
The “audio” portion of what was soon to be known as the audiovisual
movement began soon after the introduction of recorded sound and radio 
broadcasting. Sound recording was integrated with film during the 1920s
(Heinich et al., p. 18). In 1920, the Radio Division of the U. S. Department of
Commerce was established and it began to license commercial and educational
radio stations. Classroom broadcasting to enhance instruction spread rapidly
during the decades preceding World War II (Cuban, 1986).
During the 1920s and 1930s, radio became the focus of a number of
educational experiments. Among these was the Ohio School of the Air in 1929,
launched in a joint effort by the State of Ohio, Ohio State University, and a
Cincinnati radio station. During the same time period, other universities around
the country experiment with educational radio. Typical broadcasts included
lectures and performances by college bands and orchestras (Newby et al.,
2000).
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The advent of the sound film in the late 1920s introduced a critical period
in the instructional film history. Just as educators were becoming convinced of
the educational merits of the silent film, the advocates of sound realized that they 
would have to fight the old battle all over again to gain acceptance of this new
technology, especially since they believed many educators feared that sound
would obsolete their silent film equipment. Aside from this battle, the commercial 
education film enterprises were failing at an alarming rate during the late 1920s
and early 1930s as the Great Depression was in progress.
“Ironically...commercial instructional film producers seemed to fail just when 
research findings were emphasizing the particular usefulness of the film as a
medium of instruction” (Saettler, 1968, p. 110).
The early years of the audiovisual movement were characterized
principally by the formation of professional organizations and distribution. School
districts, universities, and state bureaus of visual instruction concentrated on the
collection and distribution of a wide variety of visual media. Technological 
advances were made in the film in terms of film media, projectors, etc. (Saettler,
1990).
The early period in the history of audiovisual instruction came to a close
with the advent of World War II, when the audiovisual movement and
instructional technology began to more closely align; and efforts to develop self- 
contained sequences of audiovisual instruction were developed to effectively 
address wartime preparedness training within the industrial and military sectors 
during the war (Saettler, 1968).
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Section III:
ORGANIZING TO DEVELOP THE NATION’S 
MILITARY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH,
AND MANPOWER TRAINING CAPABILITIES
World War II, according to Urban and Wagoner (2000), was destined to
have long-range significance on education: “Interestingly, in some respects the
World War II years provided more changes for education and educators than the 
depression years. Yet, these changes, as so often is the case in the history of 
education, were influenced by external events and forces more than by the 
premeditated designs of educators or educational policy-makers” (p. 279-80).
Wartime Preparedness Training on the Home Front
A significant change took place in high schools, as the nation prepared for 
war—particularly as teen-age boys began to enlist in the military and, later, when 
Roosevelt lowered the draft age from 21 to 18. The phenomenon of youth 
unemployment that was so prevalent during the 1930s had practically 
disappeared, as the demands of war and wartime production came to the 
forefront. Moreover, high schools no longer faced a threat from government 
agencies such as the NYA and CCC, both of which had disappeared as 
alternatives for high school aged youth. “To help prepare these boys for military
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service, many high schools began offering vocational courses to teach them the
skills they would need either in the military or in military-related defense 
industries. The schools were simply contributing to the nation’s effort to fight a
war with multiple enemies on several fronts” (Urban and Wagoner, p. 280).
World War II also marked the turning point in federal policy toward higher
education in several important respects: non-commission and commissioned
officer training programs conducted on college campuses, cooperative 
development of standardized testing, the emergence of education-by­
correspondence for military personnel, federal support for university based
research; and, student financial assistance for the returning veterans.
Concerning the officer training programs, Hamilton and Laufer (1975)
noted that the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) was established in
1943 on more than 350 public and private campuses. The purpose of the
program, and that of the Navy’s V-12 College Training Program, was to send
thousands of military personnel to some of the best schools as part of the 
services’ officer candidate training, until the ROTC programs were reestablished
again in 1946 (p. 15). Stubblefield and Keane (1994) add that the ASTP and V- 
12 programs, “along with similar programs, accelerated college education,
expanded science and technology courses, and introduced new methods of
instruction. In making college education available based on ability and not on 
social status, the program (sic) had the unintended sociological consequence of 
democratizing higher education. Because of their experience, many trainees 
return to college after the war” (p. 242).
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Stubblefield and Keane (1994) state that wartime demands on American
industries increased the need for training more workers in the sciences and 
engineering, and more rapid training was required for skilled positions: “Civilian
manpower needs were anticipated in June 1940 when Congress made its first
appropriation for national defense training. Both the federal government and 
private industry took initiative to train the civilian work force. The War Manpower
Commission, created in April 1942, established policies and regulations to meet 
the needs of industry and agriculture” (p. 239-240).
The civilian counterpart to ASTP and V-12 military training programs was
the Engineering, Science, and Management War Training Program, which gave 
operating grants directly to colleges and universities to provide “courses of 
critical importance to citizens” (Hamilton and Laufer, 1975, p. 16). These 
programs also helped to keep these schools financially solvent at a time when
enrollments had dropped due to war-related manpower needs (Hamilton and
Laufer, 1975). “In 1942-43, 800,000 men and women took college courses to
promote productivity. The courses lasted from three to six months and were 
usually coordinated by extension and engineering divisions” (Stubblefield and
Keane, 1994, p. 240).
American higher education was also instrumental in working closely with
the armed services in developing standardized intelligent and achievement tests,
given to every man and woman before he or she entered the military. “For the
first time, there was documented proof of the poor quality of education
administered by the states. Thousands of men were draft rejectees on the basis
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of low scores on the entrance exams” (Hamilton and Laufer, 1975, p. 17). 
Although the United States eventually built an armed forces of approximately 12
million people, the Selective Service also rejected 676,00 men because they had 
not completed four years of schooling. The Depression had sharply reduced the
financial resources available to the nation’s public school systems and colleges,
exposing the deficiencies in American education (Stubblefield and Keane, 1994).
Though the war brought the aforementioned projects to the larger colleges 
and universities, most institutions of higher learning suffered during the war— 
particularly the smaller ones. “The large, prestigious universities had been able 
to sustain reasonable enrollments by offering draft-deferrable hard science and
engineering courses and by housing the mass of student soldiers and sailors 
whose training brought them to the college campuses with full federal funding to 
pay their way” (Nasaw, 1979, p. 177).
Although the war entailed difficulties for colleges and universities, 
according to Freeland (1987) “their extensive involvement in the military effort 
stirred a new awareness of the social importance of academic work. This ‘habit 
of thought’ extended into the postwar period, as educators, exhilarated by 
wartime patriotism, looked for new ways to contribute to social problem solving. 
As they did so, they exhibited a further effect of their recent experience: a
tendency to focus on national concerns—as distinct from regional or local ones—
far more intensively than they had done before 1940 (p. 587).
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The Role of Foundations in Supporting Prewar Scientific Research
Prior to the war, “outside of the agricultural research undertaken at the
land grant universities, the federal government sponsored little university
research. Most nonagricultural research sponsored by the government was
undertaken by federal agencies and in federal laboratories” (Kleinman, 1995, p.
29). The prewar scientific research environment provided a context within which
the federal research connections with private industry and research universities 
would soon begin to take place. Several U. S. industries had developed 
autonomous research capabilities. This defined their interest in pre- and post-war
policies that maintained the federal government’s support for basic, but not
applied, research. Firms from these industries focused on applied research and 
wanted no competition from government in this area. Instead, they saw a role for 
government in basic research, which was not directly profitable, but ultimately an 
important basis for their own work (Kleinman, 1995).
Private industry was a regular supporter of university research during the 
inter-war years, between World War I and II. However, industry-oriented 
research did not substantially boost the research capacity of universities, given 
the fact industry tended to support graduate students in selected fields. Centers 
for conducting engineering research began to emerge at MIT and the University 
of Michigan at Ann Arbor. Linkages with universities also became commonplace 
in the chemical, electrical power, computer, pharmaceutical, and
telecommunications industries. Foundations were, in contrast, most influential in
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transforming university research: they were recurrent sources of support for the
direct expenses associated with conducting research, in a period of time when
the pronounced emphasis was the ‘collegiate syndrome’ of peer pressure, 
athletics, and extra-curriculum in college life—“giving tangible backing to the 
academic side of the university” (Geiger, 1986, p. 280).
Absent from the abovementioned university-based research scenarios 
was the federal government. Prior to the World War I, tuition proceeds helped
support research. In addition, ad hoc philanthropy was an important source of
research support for private universities and state universities relied on state
government funds. Universities initiated fund-raising efforts and among the early 
supporters were alumni and local communities. Foundations, created by leading 
industrialists such as John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie, provided large 
donations and, as in the case of the University of Chicago, helped to establish 
new colleges and universities. The exception to the role of the federal
government in supporting university-based research was agricultural research at 
land grant universities. By 1940, of the $13 million of federally sponsored 
research in universities throughout the country, most of this was provided by the 
U. S. Department of Agriculture (Kleinman, 1995).
During World War I, the relationship between America’s universities and 
science-based industries and foundations began to take shape and solidify: 
wartime research initiated at colleges and universities was not financed by the 
federal government, but rather it was paid for by the institutions themselves or 
the National Research Council (NRC), operated by the Rockefeller and Carnegie
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Foundations (Hamilton and Laufer, 1975). The NRC’s creation facilitated the
establishment of a “social network between business, science, and foundation
elites. This network proved important in defining research policy during World
War II and ultimately the postwar period” (Kleinman, 1995, p. 39). For example,
the Rockefeller Foundation supported the NRC’s fellowship program, and the 
Carnegie Corporation supported the Council with a $5 million grant for housing 
its principal offices and an endowment (Geiger, 1986).
Prior to 1920, foundation support centered on research with practical 
applications consistent with foundation’s founding commitment to improving 
human welfare. Most often this support was made to establish independent 
research institutes, typically under foundation control. In addition, funds 
contributed to individual university endowments could be used in any way the 
recipients desired. In the waning days of World War I, there was a shift in
foundation policy toward postdoctoral fellowship programs. These fellowships 
strengthened the research focus of American universities by giving scientists 
time away from teaching, thus foundations increasingly targeted their support 
within universities. Significantly, a million dollar Rockefeller fellowship granted to 
Ernest Lawrence led to the development of the cyclotron, which played a crucial 
role in the development of the atomic bomb; and, twenty-three members of the 
Manhattan Project, in the early years, were Rockefeller Fellows (Kleinman,
1995).
Through the NRC, created by a group of the nation’s academic and 
industrial science elites as a spin-off of the National Academy of Sciences, the
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federal government was advised on matters of science and technology. In turn, 
on the basis of support from the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations, along 
with some federal funding, the NRC established a committee that informed
universities about projects and problems the federal government was interested
in. The NRC was an important force in the war effort. Its strategic military
importance is exemplified by its oversight of projects that achieved large-scale
production of optical glass, nitrates, and poison gas. The NRC legitimized the
concentration of research support in a few research universities and established
what would later be an important principle of research by contract: “Contract
research allowed scientists to remain at their ‘home’ universities rather than work
in central government laboratory” (Kleinman, 1995, p. 18). For industry, the NRC 
forged the beginnings of close ties between universities and industry: In the 
1920s, firms hired university-trained scientists and technicians, some companies 
provided university fellowships to expand the scientifically literate workforce, and 
others hired university scientists as consultants (Kleinman, 1995).
Research relationships mentioned above, that formed before and during
World War I, did not fundamentally alter the nature of support for university 
research following the war and during the interwar years. As was the case prior
to World War I, a significant portion of university budgets came from student
tuition and fees in private colleges and universities and from state appropriations
for public universities. The concentration of research funding to a small number
of universities during the war also continued. For example, during the period
between 1902 and 1925, the Rockefeller General Education Board awarded
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nearly two thirds of its total science grants to just eight institutions—California
Institute of Technology, Princeton, Cornell, Vanderbilt, Harvard, Stanford,
Rochester, and Chicago. Similarly, the Carnegie Endowment, established at
roughly the same time (Carnegie in 1911 and Rockefeller in 1913), followed the
same pattern of tunneling research funds to a relatively small number of
universities. Both foundations saw the emergence of universities as major 
spheres of scientific research, and their funding of university research shaped
postwar research policy making and, thus, the postwar scientific field. The 
foundations were, in fact, a source of the important precedent of supporting the 
university by contract (Kleinman, 1995).
The NRC was followed in the 1920s by proposals for a national research
fund raised by private industry and used to support university research in basic 
science. In the 1930s, the Science Advisory Board (SAB), a government-funded
but privately-directed advisory board within the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS), tried to coordinate federal research activities and promote basic science.
When that effort failed, NRC fellowships and foundation grants for pure science
were conducted at a limited number of universities. However, an effective
solution was not found until June 1940, when President Roosevelt established
the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC)—the brainchild of Vannevar
Bush, then chairman of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics
(NACA)—composed of Bush, Karl Compton, President of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, James Conant, President of Harvard University, and
48
Frank Jewitt, a top executive at American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(Rowan, 1985)
Wartime Research and the Office of Scientific Research and Development
Prior to World War II, the federal government’s role in higher education
focused primarily on aid and grants made for limited and specific purposes.
World War II marked the beginning of a period of expansion in the federal
government’s involvement in higher education. With the war came the federal 
government’s decision to rely on universities for basic and applied research, and 
to establish partnerships in developing training programs for armed services 
personnel. World War II marked the beginning of federally sponsored university 
based research, largely devoted to defense contracts. In the 1940s, research
was entirely a private undertaking with few exceptions. A year prior to America’s 
entry into World War II, the Federal government was spending only $74 million 
for research and development, conducted primarily in government-owned labs. 
“The World War ll-era decision to rely on universities for basic and applied
research had enormous consequences for universities. Only ten institutions 
could be called research universities in 1940, whereas 125 are today” (Kerr,
1994, p. 31).
Bonner (1986) states that, “the vast changes that crumbled the ivory tower 
of 1940 were not only unforeseen and unplanned, but were largely unintended
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and sometimes unwanted. Educators did not control these developments but 
were carried along on the swift social and demographic currents that washed 
over their hermetic little world—the demands of war, returning veterans,
international crises, economic growth....While university leaders, by and large, 
responded intelligently and imaginatively— sometimes heroically—they were 
never able to delineate with confidence the shape of higher education or
determine what it should be. Like the French generals of 1940, they were always 
too busy plugging the gaps in their defenses from the last war” (p. 44).
The federal government poured money into university research labs and 
enlisted the aid of university scientists to help with the war and defense efforts. 
“The federal government and higher education assumed the roles of buyer and 
seller respectively. The federal agencies bought the services of the universities 
and their facilities. The agencies were interested in promoting their specific 
goals, not in advancing the cause of higher education” (Hamilton and Laufer,
1975, p. 16).
The NRC, as noted previously, followed a practice of concentration and
contract research during World War I. In the late 1930s, a similarly small group of
universities dominated research; and, during World War II, the practice of
concentration and contract research would be reinforced by government
practices. Of the sixteen universities spending the most on research, all but four
were among the top twenty-five non-industrial contractors to the Office of
Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) during World War II. Among the
elite research universities under contract to the federal government during World
50
War II, aside from those mentioned previously: the University of California, 
Columbia University, University of Illinois, University of Michigan, University of 
Minnesota, Yale University, University of Wisconsin, Johns Hopkins University, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), University of North Carolina, 
University of Texas, and Ohio Wesleyan University (Hamilton and Laufer, 1975).
Key to war-related initiatives, and the tunneling of research dollars to the
universities, was the formation of the National Defense Research Committee
(NDRC), the predecessor to the OSRD, headed by Vannevar Bush. “The 
urgency of developing technology for the war meant that money was not hard to 
come by for the NDRC, and this significantly enhanced the committee’s
freedom....By June 1941, the NRDC had signed 207 contracts to forty-one
universities and 22 companies. Thus, in one year, the NRDC had become a 
major player in U. S. war preparations” (Kleinman, 1995, p. 62).
Bush’s background, appointment to head this elite vanguard of science, is
important to mention at this juncture because of the social capital he amassed
within the previously mentioned network of business, science, and foundations.
Previously, he spent his early career at MIT working on borderline basic and
applied research, applying the theories of Norbert Wiener to the construction of
‘machines for mathematical analysis’. This research led to the development of a
sophisticated differential analyzer, which is considered a mechanical antecedent
to the electronic computer. He later became the dean of engineering and vice
president of MIT in 1932, and remained there until he became president of the
Carnegie Institution in Washington in 1939. While at MIT, Bush became linked to
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the federal administration of science through his role on government boards, 
such as the Science Advisory Board (SAB) headed by MIT’s Karl Compton, to 
whom Bush reported. SAB was a Depression-era body to provide science 
advice to government agencies and promote government support of scientific 
research. Later, he was appointed to the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (NACA), which had been created in 1915 to supervise and
coordinate American aeronautical research. He became its chair prior to 
America’s entry into World War I. His appointment to the presidency of the 
Carnegie Institution in Washington in 1939, the nation’s largest private research 
organization outside of the universities, gave him entree into the highest levels of 
national scientific research and development policy (Kleinman, 1995).
The NDRC later became a part of the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development (OSRD), a civilian dominated organization devoted to applying 
scientific know-how to the war effort and reported directly to the President 
(Gruson, 1977). OSRD’s creation was based on recommendations of a report 
Bush submitted to the Bureau of the Budget on the NDRC’s limitations, and in
July 1941, a year after the NDRC was created, President Roosevelt signed an 
executive order (prepared with the assistance of Bush and Conant) creating the 
OSRD as part of the Office for Emergency Management. “Scientists gained a 
kind of autonomy and power of which they could have only have dreamt in the
past” (Kleinman, 1995, p. 64-5). Bush became the chair of the OSRD, and
Conant succeeded him in the NDRC (England, 1982).
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Bush’s OSRD group subcontracted specific projects to campus-based 
scientists, who continued to work in university laboratories (Freeland, 1997). 
Essentially, it followed the same standard as the NRC in terms of providing 
research funds under contract for specific projects to an elite, concentrated 
group of research universities; and, one that allowed scientists to undertake the 
research at their home universities (Kleinman, 1995). “In making these 
agreements, the committee was given complete latitude, including the freedom 
to promote projects that were neither requested nor desired by the military. This, 
of course, set a precedent for the ultimate project of Bush’s scientific vanguard: 
to assure scientist control over government resources for research” (p. 62). 
According to Lomask (1975), President Roosevelt took “an active and personal 
interest in the OSRD’s activities and problems. Indeed, Vannevar Bush’s easy 
access to the presidential ear was one of OSRD’s greatest assets” (Kleinman,
1995, p. 39).
OSRD cooperated with the military but was not controlled or dominated by 
it. Its mission was to contract with university laboratories for scientific products 
and services, and do this in such a way as to minimize the scientists’ fears of 
government intrusion into scientific and academic freedom, except in instances 
when secrecy was required. Vannevar Bush, James Conant, Karl Compton, and 
Frank R. Jewitt were key leaders in the drive to mobilized the nation’s scientific 
community under the direction of the OSRD: “The response of the university 
scientists was quick, and the application of highly sophisticated knowledge and 
manpower, working relatively free from governmental ‘control’, had spectacular
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results. The atom bomb, radar, the proximity fuse, and sonar, were the most 
highly publicized among scores of other scientific and technological innovations” 
(Gruson, 1977, p. 4). Of special note here is the federal government’s practice of 
using civilian scientists on a part-time basis to serve on government committees 
and policy boards. Therefore, Bush was able to retain his full-time position at the 
Carnegie Institution, Conant at Harvard, and Compton at MIT. Not surprisingly, 
the largest amount of funds allocated to any university was granted to MIT,
where Bush had been vice president. Harvard, where Conant was president, 
ranked third; and, the Carnegie Institution was in the top fifteen non-industrial
recipients (Kleinman, 1995).
Given the OSRD’s success, President Roosevelt appointed a cabinet-
level committee, the President’s Scientific Research Board, to consider the
federal government’s future interest in scientific work. One of the committee’s 
principal recommendations in its 1947 report was to “propose a National Science 
Foundation (NSF) to administer federal grants for basic research and 
channeling support to university-based investigators” (Freeland, 1997, p. 588).
“Franklin Roosevelt’s decision early in the war to heed Vannevar Bush’s advice
and use the talent and facilities of the universities, rather than build separate
laboratories, for war research resulted in a vastly expanded university capability
in science, a national commitment to basic research on a newly grand scale, and
such government-university partnerships as the National Science Foundation”
(Bonner, 1986, p. 45-47).
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The consequences of the OSRD’s success after the war were several.
First, the military services recognized that support of basic science could have 
large ‘pay offs’ for them. The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy 
Commission became major supporters of basic scientific research in universities
after the war. Second, after considerable political debate, the National Science
Foundation was created in 1950. “For the first time the nation had a
governmental agency the primary purpose of which was to support basic
scientific research. In the main, the National Science Foundation has prospered
without resorting to the principle that projects meriting its support serve an
immediate national purpose” (Gruson, 1987, p. 5).
A third consequence of the OSRD’s success is that by the time the NSF
was established, the influence of federal support was so pervasive that, for
example, ninety percent of natural science research in the United States was
funded by the federal government. Another important facet of the NSF’s mission
is to provide graduate fellowships and scholarships, further strengthening 
graduate education on the nation’s college campuses and improving science
education. Together, the NSF, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department
of Defense, and the Public Health Service “provided the bulk of grants and
scholarships for the next fifteen years. The allotment of funds was limited to a
few select institutions” (Hamilton and Laufer, 1975, p. 22).
Finally, OSRD research led to advances in blood substitutes and immune
globulins to combat infections, penicillin production (which was central to saving
lives on the battlefield), brought malaria under control, the development of the
55
atomic bomb, gun-fire control systems controlled by radar technology, proximity
fuses, allowing detonation of artillery shells at a distance calculated to do the
most damage, and other projects (Kleinman, 1995).
Wartime research also dramatically changed the rate of technological 
progress in information processing. During the war, desktop calculators (adding 
machines) were used in the design and operation of military equipment. Punched 
card equipment was used, for example to maintain records of people inducted
into military service, mobile punched-card units followed them into battle to 
identify those with special skills and to record injuries and deaths; punched card 
units controlled the flow of production in defense plants and the flow of military 
supplies; and, it was used (along with electronic vacuum tube computers) to 
decipher enemy codes and to design the first atomic bomb. Through the Naval 
Computing Machine Laboratory in Dayton, Ohio, electronic equipment for 
decrypting enemy codes during the war led to the development of the first high­
speed storage device in the form of a magnetic-drum storage unit, leading the 
way toward stored programmed computers. “Government leaders responsible for 
developing new technologies for national-security purposes put major emphasis 
on electronic computers in the immediate post-World War II era. The timing was 
good. Competing requirements for other types of military electronics had been 
reduced by the cessation of hostilities" (Pugh and Aspray, 1996, p. 7-10).
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Preparing for War— Military and Industrial Manpower Training Programs
During the years immediately preceding and during World War II, two 
federal agencies working in cooperation with the nation’s educators, began to 
develop training techniques and visual aids that would positively impact the 
gradual emergence of instructional technology: the U. S. Armed Services 
Institute and the U. S. Department of Education’s Division of Visual Aids for War 
Training. The first of these, the U. S. Armed Forces Institute (USAFI),
headquartered in Madison, Wisconsin, served twelve million military personnel
on active duty, providing these men and women “the most extensive adult
educational program in our nation’s history....Here was an experiment in the
education of adults without parallel in any civilian undertaking. Never before in
history had such a vast program of education and information been made
available to a comparable group of American citizens” (Houle, Burr, Hamilton,
and Yale, 1947, p. 1).
In every major war in the nation’s history, civilian welfare groups provided
recreation, entertainment, and some literacy skills development activities for
soldiers. The Commission on Training Camp Activities coordinated these
activities, with the backing of the War and Navy departments, during World War
I. The Commission was headed by Raymond B. Fosdick, President of the
Rockefeller Foundation, and its creation based on his report to the Secretary of
War regarding the poor morale of Army units stationed along the border with
Mexico. The commission itself was a loose confederation of welfare groups such
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as the YMCA, YWCA, the Knights of Columbus, Jewish Welfare Board, and 
others: “The groups had military recognition and cooperation, but depended on 
public contributions for financial support....During World War I, it became clear 
that the existing arrangement was not satisfactory” (Houle et al., 1947, p. 14; 
Strehlow, 1967, p. 15). Limited resources were invested in a soldier’s education
by the military, other than the science of war (Brown, 1944).
The dissatisfaction regarding the current arrangements prompted the
Army to back a postwar education plan, proposed and, at first, largely financed
by the YMCA. Later, the YMCA officers involved with administering the plan were 
transferred into an Army Education Corps. The plan become known as the 
Education and Recreation Program, and was active for a short while following 
World War I in Army camps across the United States. The program was
curtailed, following the war, due to the drastic cutback in Army appropriations
(Strehlow, 1967).
When the Mobilization Regulations of October 28, 1939, were developed,
morale was defined in terms of physical welfare (e.g., food, leaves of absence, 
discipline, and recreation) and a committee—composed of civilian and military
experts in welfare and community-service activities—was appointed to advise
the Secretary of War on these matters. This committee was also expanded at the
direction of the President to include the Navy and Marine Corps, and became the
Joint Army-Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation. It was this committee
that was instrumental in fostering the USO, a joint endeavor between the Army
and the Red Cross. The regulations proposed by the committee were put into
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effect in mid-1940 (Houle et al., 1947; Strehlow, 1967). In 1941, as proposed by
this special committee, the Army began to assume responsibility for soldiers’ 
morale by establishing a Morale Division as part of The Adjutant General’s 
Office. This division included the following units: Army Motion Picture Service, 
Recreation and Welfare, War Department Exhibits, Decorations, and Morale 
Publicity. The significance of the Morale Division is that it developed and
established the first network of educational and recreational facilities “which
became familiar to every soldier in every post or camp in the United States and
overseas” (Strehlow, 1967, p. 20).
In 1942, the Morale Division was renamed the Army Institute and located
in Madison, Wisconsin. Initially, the programs that were developed placed 
emphasis on study by mail on the principles of ‘leisure time self-teaching’, aimed 
at military personnel who had been in the service for four months or longer. Their 
purpose was to provide a resource for service men and women to further their
education or to make profitable use of their leisure time (Poste, 1944).
In July of 1943, the Army Institute was reorganized as the USAFI.
Through it and the Army Education Program, under the overall directorship of the
Army’s Adjutant General, formal literacy programs were introduced. These 
programs included correspondence courses (in cooperation with some of the
nation’s leading colleges and universities) for soldiers at training camps and
military installations, leisure time activities, counseling, and foreign language
training (Strehlow, 1967). Approximately eighty-five American universities
cooperated with the USAFI in providing correspondence courses, and many
59
more civilian schools and colleges made it possible for service personnel to 
apply for academic credit for the various types of service related education 
courses and experiences. Instructors were obtained from local military and naval 
personnel, and supplemented by educators from nearby school systems, 
business communities, colleges, and universities (Houle et al., 1947).
Aside from military preparedness training, World War II brought an 
unprecedented need to train millions of industrial workers as rapidly as possible 
to support the war effort. It was the U. S. Department of Education, under the 
leadership of Commissioner John W. Studebaker, which would assume the
major burden of meeting this enormous challenge. In 1941, the Department 
formed the Division of Visual Aids for War Training with Floyd E. Brooker as 
director. Previously, Brooker was an associate director of the American Council 
on Education’s (ACE) research studies in the area of instructional technology 
and had gained significant experience and expertise in instructional film 
production (Saettler, 1968). When the War Manpower Commission was created 
in 1942, a Bureau of Training was later created within the Commission to 
coordinate the work of the Apprenticeship Training Service, the Training Within 
Industry Service, and the War Training Programs of the U. S. Office of Education 
(Stubblefield and Keane, 1994).
Wartime Instructional Design and Development, and Media Technology
The development of instructional technology and the use of media in 
America’s schools slowed down during the war years, because of a lack of
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materials, equipment, and instructional specialists. Conversely, a period of
expansion began in the industrial and military sectors (Saettler, 1968). With the 
war threat a reality as a result of the surprise attack on the Navy’s Pacific fleet at
Pearl Harbor, airplane factories were hastily constructed and soon turned out
10,000 planes a month. Shipyards were constructed across the country and
private American industries converted to war production— automobile factories
turned to the production of tanks and other vehicles, factories that had produced
typewriters or vacuum cleaners began to turn out machine guns and ammunition, 
During the course of the war, the U. S. was able to produce approximately
297,000 planes, 86,000 tanks, and nearly 12,000 ships (Dent, 1969).
Newby et al. (2000) suggest that the war “gave a big boost to the field of
instructional design. The need to rapidly train tens of thousands of new military 
personnel created a heightened interest in applying educational research in a
systematic way. Many educational researchers participated in the war training 
effort, and this helped to propel forward systematic efforts to design instruction. 
During the war, the fruits of this effort were seen primarily in increased use of 
educational media to train military personnel” (p. 317).
Instructional technology was recognized by the armed services as holding
important implications for military training and readiness. During World War I, the
Army and Navy had introduced training films and had begun to establish
procedures for the instructional uses of such media as slides, filmstrips, and
models. Civilian educators exerted the dominant influences in the character of
military training programs: many had previously conducted experimental
61
research on instructional media and had developed various forms of instructional 
technology. They were grouped with artists, communications specialists, 
advertising personnel, and theatrical and motion picture professionals to develop 
a technology of instruction applicable to military needs. Military direction provided 
stability and continuity in the training programs. “There had been recognition in 
the armed services prior to World War II that instructional technology held 
important implications for military training....The urgent and rapid expansion of 
military training due to World War II created a new demand for training materials”
(Saettler, 1968, p. 166).
World War II provided a new dimension and enormous challenge due to 
urgent and rapid expansion of military training, which in turn created a 
tremendous demand for training materials. In the process, the armed services
experienced many problems in addressing this challenge during the first eight
months following the nation’s entry into the war. Instructional equipment was 
generally obsolete or lacking, and instructors were often inadequately trained
and inexperienced, and frequently failed to use what visual media that was
available at the appropriate time or in effective ways. Scarcity of adequate
equipment and instructional materials was commonplace, and the demand was
sudden and nearly overwhelming. Therefore, military schools and instructors
improvised a number of instructional devices for use in their training programs,
resulting in a lack of uniformity until standardization began to be implemented in
1943 (Saettler, 1968).
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Instructional media and materials used by military included projected 
motion pictures, graphics (illustrations and cartoons), posters, sound, and 
charts— supplemented by manuals, self-instructional devices and materials, 
handbooks, bulletins, and other training related literature. To more fully utilize the 
usefulness of films for both experienced and inexperienced instructors, a visual 
film unit was produced consisting of the motion picture film, a silent filmstrip
correlated with it, and instructor’s manual. Each unit in a series was considered
to be the equivalent of a lesson, based on the specific tasks or subject matter to
be learned (Saettler, 1968).
“When World War II began, the use of educational films was made a part
of the official policy of the War Department, the effect of this policy was that the
armed forces produced more than six times the number of films than had ever
been produced before for educational purposes. Moreover, the demand for 
training millions of industrial workers as rapidly and effectively as possible 
brought about a historic production of educational films for training purposes” 
(Saettler, 1968, p. 114). Educational films and other media became an integral
part of the training effort for the war. Heinich et al. (1996) document the
following:
During the war years, the U. S. government produced over 800 training
films and filmstrips, purchased tens of thousands of projectors, spent
about one billion dollars on training films, purchased over 55,000 film
projectors, and produced 457 training films at a cost of over a billion
dollars during the war. This rapid deployment of large quantities of
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mediated instruction certainly influenced the field and contributed to the
perception that media can be very useful for educational training, (p. 24)
One training device that was especially popular was the filmstrip projector.
For example, the filmstrip was the medium that answered the demand for a fast,
efficient, mass training of mechanics to serve in industry and the military—
becoming the ideal, fast, and indispensable tool for training. The motorization of
America’s mushrooming armed forces, and the sustaining of its numerous
mechanized units, required more than a hundred thousand mechanics (Dent,
1969). Another useful device was the microfilm reader, which had been in
production since 1938 to preserve important records and duplicate library
materials in such a way to save valuable storage space. These readers were
used by the U. S. military and by industries for research and testing purposes 
during and after the war (Dent, 1969).
The worldwide Armed Forces Radio Network with 177 Army and Navy
stations, 54 government and commercial stations, and 149 sound-reproduction 
systems was also instrumental in wartime training efforts. Each week 77 popular
American radio programs were transcribed for the entertainment and information
of armed services personnel. The Army itself—with the help of famous stage,
screen and radio stars—produced 15 program hours every week; and, some
66,000 transcriptions were completed and distributed overseas for rebroadcast
every month (Houle et al., 1947).
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Among the training aids designed and produced during the war was the 
aircraft recognition program, initiated at the Ohio State University and developed 
in cooperation with the editors of Flying Magazine. This program involved the 
manufacturing of tens of thousands of 2” x 2” slides, produced from photos of
American and allied aircraft, as well as the aircraft of enemy nations, to teach
military personnel to instantly recognize enemy planes and distinguish between
friendly and unfriendly aircraft. The slides were projected onto a screen by a 
projector equipped with a camera shutter device. This machine became known 
as a tachistoscope. Another wartime program involved the development of a
bomb-spotting trainer, used to train and grade the efforts of a plane crew’s 
bombing efficiency (Dent, 1969).
Numerous training aids that were developed during the war, later found 
use in the civilian sector following the war. Among these one can include the Link 
trainer, which provided a cadet pilot with a moving view of the earth
accompanied by realistic sounds of aircraft on recordings; mockups, exhibit 
rooms, and ‘breadboards’ of simulated maps, equipment, battle front layouts and 
equipment operation. Audio recording and playback devices were especially
prominent in foreign language training (Saettler, 1968). Another device, the 
Viewgraph was designed and manufactured by a company of the same name.
This early version of the overhead projector replaced the clumsy opaque
projectors that were in use prior to the war, and was used by the Navy for map 
briefings and instruction. The Viewgraph was considered as being more practical
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than opaque projectors because notes could be written directly on Viewgraph’s
material (Heinich et al., 1996).
One important wartime development that directly influenced educational
policies during the postwar period was intelligence testing. Intelligence testing
has its origins in the Progressive Era of American education and was used in
World War I, by the Army and the American Psychological Association, to 
develop group intelligence tests as a means to identify appropriate candidates for
officer training school and screen recruits to determine their mental capacities to
handle the demands of military service. These developments continued
throughout World War II, and their successes led to the development of
standardized testing products that were designed to be used in the nation’s
schools to measure the educational potential and achievement of students
(Urban and Wagoner, p. 234). After the war, the testing and assessment
programs that were developed out of joint efforts of the U.S. Armed Forces
Institute, the U. S. Office of Education and the ACE led the way to the formulation 
of the present General Education Development (GED) program in 1956. This
effort laid the groundwork for the statewide equivalency degree ultimately
developed in all states, and the basis of Federal and state commitments to adult
education through preparatory programs linked to the GED (Rose, 1994).
World War II was also instrumental in the evolution and development of
visual aids as an instructional media. The widespread use of this media to
accelerate military and industry training during the war “brought to the public
after the war an influential endorsement of the teaching value of visual aids.... In
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the minds of the men and women who had trained or been trained during the 
war, a general sentiment regarding teaching methods pervaded: visual aids can 
teach more people more things in less time” (Dent, 1969, p. 99).
Meanwhile, thousands of men and women with wartime visual aids
training experience, whose educations had been interrupted by the war, returned 
from overseas and took advantage of the educational opportunities provided by 
the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, better known as the Gl Bill of
Rights. In a 1945 article published in the SVE Visual Review, S. A. Mckay, who 
had been director of the Visual training Program for the Royal Canadian Navy 
expressed his concern regarding the new set of demands on postwar 
educational methods by the large ranks of returning military service personnel. In 
the article, MacKay warned educators that many traditional methods of high 
school and college lecturing had been outdated by war training techniques and 
procedures. He predicted that returning military veterans would insist that they 
receive an education in the modern way with lectures and textbooks amply 
augmented by visual aids: “Many of these young men and women have been 
trained by the streamlined methods of the services, and they will not have 
patience with any method of teaching that does not provide the maximum of 
learning in the minimum of time” (Dent, 1969, p. 100).
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Section IV:
SIGNIFICANT POSTWAR INTERVENTIONS IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Even as World War II waged in Europe, Africa, and later in the Pacific—
its favorable outcome for the U. S. and its Allies far from being certain— 
Congress and President Roosevelt began to initiate plans for two major
legislative bills that would have significant social, economic, and political impacts
on the nation. The first concerned the postwar adjustment for America’s returning
veterans, and an attempt to advert unemployment and dislocations following the
war. This legislation, the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, was signed into law by
President Franklin Roosevelt on June 22, 1944. The second was intended to
continue the federal government’s role in the sponsorship of scientific research
and science training. Continuing the wartime achievements in science and
technology was considered as crucial to the postwar economy and to winning the
Cold War competition with the Soviet Union. The end result of this legislative
process came in 1950, in the form of the National Science Foundation Act.
Early Planning for the Return of America’s War Veterans and Demobilization
Even as the nation simultaneously trained and prepared for war during the
1940s, the image of servicemen returning home after the war increasingly
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became a political issue. Many history texts cite the fear of the potential adverse
impact that returning servicemen would have on the economy as the primary 
justification for passage of the Gl Bill of Rights of 1944. Although this is true, the 
reality is that plans were in the making as early as 1940 to prepare for the return
of World War II veterans. World War I and the plight of its veterans were, in part,
the impetus for early planning for the return of WWII veterans (Olson, 1994).
The individuals and organizations responsible for planning and sponsoring
the Gl Bill legislation were mindful of, and respectful toward, the past. The past 
provided ominous lessons: America had traditionally granted postwar benefits to
able-bodied veterans, except after World War I (Olson, p. 18). A postwar bonus
for World War I veterans would be paid only after a march on Washington, where
two veterans and two children died after soldiers commanded by General
Douglas MacArthur stormed the parade to disperse the protesting veterans
(Bennett, 1996). “It was the first instance in which ordinary Americans marched
into Washington to demand benefits to which they thought they were entitled”
(Bennett, p. 67).
The bitterness and disruption following the release of World War I 
veterans into an economy jolted by the shift from war to peacetime production;
memories of the Depression of the 1930; the riots in other countries after the end
of World War I; and, the role that unemployed European veterans had played in
the rise of fascism and Hitler and his Brown Shirts—all evoked an additional
element of fear in the minds of many Americans (D. E. Johnson, 1970). “After
the conclusion of World War I, the U.S. went through almost three years of
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ethnic, racial, and labor-management strife before normalcy returned” (Bennett, 
1996, p. 4). “One did not have to be a very astute student of history to realize 
that returning veterans without jobs could become a revolutionary mass just
waiting to explode” (Nasaw, 1979, p. 173).
Therefore, prior to the nation’s entry into World War II, plans were being
developed for the post-war adjustment of service personnel and the conclusion
of the war. In 1940, the Educational Policies Commission’ report on Education 
and Economic Well-Being in American Democracy designated longer secondary 
education, in junior and senior high schools, as the vehicle for prolonging the 
average period of schooling in the United States. These recommendations were 
not made solely in the name of education, but also as an instrument of 
manpower readjustment. “Advocates of manpower readjustment envisioned 
educational institutions as both training grounds and holding places. The 
prolongation of education would delay labor market entry and thereby check 
unemployment in the wake of postwar demobilization” (Kett, 1994, p. 416).
The “best solution” to this unemployment problem, according to Nasaw
(1979), would have been to guarantee employment for returning veterans: “The
Selective Service Act of 1940 attempted to provide the first draftees with such a
guarantee, requiring employers to rehire at the same rate of pay, in the same
position, workers who had gone off to war. The postwar planners would have
been only too happy to guarantee work to all veterans. But they knew better.
There were simply not enough jobs to go around, nor could enough be created
to put all the demobilized soldiers back to work (p. 174).
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In anticipation of a great influx of returning veterans into higher education 
after the war, educators strongly voiced the concern that the Gl Bill legislation
would “open postsecondary education to a floodtide of unqualified students and
consequently depress academic standards” (Moorefield, 1974, p. 25). Educators 
worried that among those who took advantage of the Gl Bill’s educational 
benefits, many would be veterans who previously had no hope nor intention of
going to college. James Conant, president of Harvard at the end of the war, 
thought that the bill was a mistake. He felt that it did not “distinguish between 
those who can profit most by advanced education and those who cannot” and
could bring the “least capable among the war generation” into the colleges.
Others worried about the ability of older men with obsolete education credentials
to be successful in college (Bonner, 1986, p. 46).
The American Council on Education (ACE), with funding from the
Carnegie Corporation, undertook several studies when it established the 
Commission on the Implications of Armed Services Educational Programs. One
result of the studies was a recommendation by the Council that an accreditation 
program be established. Its purpose would be to assess the knowledge and skills
that servicemen and women had acquired through the USAFI training and
correspondence courses, and to assist the military in assessing the educational
significance of military experiences. “Accordingly, the University of Chicago 
developed end-of-course tests, examinations to determine proficiency in subject
matter, and examinations to determine returning veteran’s level for future
schooling. In 1944, the ACE published A Guide to the Evaluation of Military
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Experiences in the Armed Services, a handbook for civilian educators describing
military courses and recommendations for credit. Accreditation was important for 
higher education officials and veterans alike because it accelerated veterans’ 
progress in postwar education” (Stubblefield and Keane, 1994, p. 245-6).
As events during the war turned in favor of the Allies late in 1943, D. E.
Johnson (1970) notes that the nation’s politicians began to seriously contemplate
the return of millions of war veterans and the potential impact they would have
on the economy, particularly when one considered the sheer number of returning
veterans. “Fearful of the untoward consequences of a massive influx of new
workers into the economy, the President, Congress, the American Legion, and
the American Council on Education considered early in the war how to
reintegrate veterans into American society. On June 22, 1944, President
Roosevelt signed into law the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, popularly known
as the Gl Bill of Rights” (p.226).
A Bill of Rights for Gl Joe and Jane... and the Nation!
“It was called the Gl Bill of Rights because ‘G.I.’ was the catchall name
for enlisted men and women in the American military forces of World War II, an
abbreviation of ‘general issue’, the name for all standard equipment, clothing and
weapons” (Bennett, 1996, p. 22). The American Legion originally coined it “a Bill
of Rights for Gl Joe and Jane” (Bennett, p. 90).
The Gl Bill of Rights of 1944 represents one of the most lasting, significant
and radically empowering Federal legislative actions in the twentieth century.
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The centerpiece of this legislation was the unemployment relief, often referred to 
as the 52-20 Club, the weekly payment of $20 for fifty-two weeks to veterans 
who could not find jobs in the first year following discharge from the service. The 
bill also included incentives for veterans for home and farm mortgages, business 
loans, job counseling, insurance, pensions, medical benefits, education, and 
mustering-out pay. Aside from these benefits, the original Gl Bill fully subsidized 
education or job training for over 7.8 million World War II men and women
veterans, making higher education and career oriented training a realistic
expectation rather than an impossible dream for many. This legislation supported 
various forms of education that ranged from adult literacy classes, high school 
completion, and college and university education, to professional and vocational
training (Moorefield, 1974; Bonner, 1986).
Veterans were eligible for education benefits if they served for at least 90
days of active duty, and received other than a dishonorable discharge. They
were entitled to a maximum of 48 months of training, depending upon the length
of service. The Veterans Administration (VA) paid the schools veterans attended 
a maximum of $500 a year for tuition and other costs. In addition, married 
veterans received a $651 month allowance and single veterans, $50 (Rose, 
1994). One requirement of the bill was that in order to qualify for schooling,
veterans must be 25 years or younger. Veterans who entered the armed
services beyond the age of 25 years were limited to one year of schooling,
unless they could demonstrate that the war had interrupted their education. The
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age restriction was removed by an amendment to the bill in December 1945
(Kett, 1994).
Most colleges and universities altered their admission policies to admit 
non-high school graduates and provided “catch-up” help on campus. However,
this generosity was based on the assumption that few veterans would take
advantage of this opportunity to enter college after the long interruption to their
education caused by the war (Bonner, 1986). “No one really anticipated the huge
numbers of veterans who made use of the Gl Bill. This flood of returnees
entering schools and colleges brought new meaning to the notion of equal 
educational opportunity” (Urban and Wagoner, 2000, p. 282). “In March 1945, 
Earl McGrath, a World War II veteran and a dean at the University of Buffalo 
(and later U.S. Commissioner of Education), analyzed three wartime studies of 
veteran’s attitudes toward higher education and concluded that in no coming
academic year would more than 150,000 veterans become full-time students in
colleges and universities” (Kett, 1994, p. 417).
In reality, veterans flooded into the nation’s institutions of higher 
education. “Rarely have educators had so pleasant a shock as in the years 
following the war” (Bonner, 1986, p. 46). Of a veteran’s population of 15.4 
million, the original Gl Bill fully subsidized education or job training for over 7.8 
million (or, 50 percent of) the former World War II service personnel. Of that 
number, over 2.2 million of them attended colleges and universities. The total 
cost of the program was $14.5 billion (Rose, 1994). “Tuition fees almost doubled 
in many cases; state colleges and universities were allowed to charge all
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veterans out-of-state tuition to help pay for the added cost caused by the 
massive influx of students. Colleges and universities had to absorb the overhead
costs of veterans’ offices which handled the administrative ‘red tape’ created by
the G. I. Bill” (Hamilton and Laufer, 1975, p. 16).
Gl Bill legislation made higher education and career oriented training a
realistic expectation rather than an impossible dream for many. Two years before
WW II began, approximately 160,000 students graduated from colleges and 
universities each year. Clark (1998) suggests that veterans, like most Americans 
during the prewar years, were initially skeptical of the benefits of an education
“unless it paid dividends or was somehow practical”. Therefore, veterans did not 
begin to descend en masse on the college and university campuses until the
1946-47 time period; and, “only then did the public and the media become
infatuated with the Gl Bill Phenomenon” (p. 174).
The peak enrollment year was 1947 when veterans accounted for 49
percent of U.S. college and university enrollments, and in 1950 the annual
graduation rate soared to nearly 500,000 (Bennett, 1996). Seventy percent of all
male college students in 1947 were Gl Bill veterans (D. E. Johnson, p. 227).
“The fresh faces came in droves, attracted by the blank-check promise of a free
college education” (Neusner and Neusner, 1995, p. 52).
Although the surge of veterans into higher education caught most
planners offguard, Kett (1994) states that the near doubling of the proportion of
17-year-olds that graduated from high school during the 1930s in a sense had
prepared the way. Among these graduates were those who had intended to
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attend, or had entered, a college or university after graduating from high school; 
in the wake of Pearl Harbor, their plans were thwarted when President Roosevelt 
lowered the draft age from 21 to 18. Moreover, many whose high school 
experiences were interrupted by the war rejected the notion of returning to high 
school to take evening classes. Instead, many opted for higher education—
particularly those who had been assigned to college campuses during the war to 
take specialized military courses or correspondence university courses through
the United States Armed Forces Institute (p. 418).
The Gl Bill and the success of adult students now attending college
prompted a change in the nation’s thinking regarding access to higher education,
who should attend, and the mission of college curricula nation-wide. First, the Gl
Bill gave an enormous push to the long-term movement from a mostly elitist form
of education before the Civil War, through the land-grant movement, and then
toward universal access following World War II. Universal access meant moving
from a mostly elite and upper-middle class access before the war, to one that 
was characterized by access by all economic classes after the war— making the
U.S. one of the first nations ever to provide universal access to higher education.
Half of the students who used the Gl Bill came from families in which neither
parent had gone to college (Kerr, 1994).
According to Neusner and Neusner (1995), many university leaders felt
the elite universities “should take advantage of rising enrollments not by
expanding their campuses, but by making them more meritocratic. This, they
argued, would have improved not only their status, but their capabilities" (p. 53).
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For example, James Bryant Conant, president of Harvard from 1933 to 1953,
suggested in 1948 that universities ought to define their task only in terms of 
teaching the most prominent, leaving the less promising students to community 
colleges. While this may come across as elitist, Conant’s approach anticipated 
an event which never came during the postwar boom years: “that a severe space 
crunch at the university level and an economic downturn driving down the 
demand for college-educated citizens...Conant’s approach underscored a larger
movement in American society...a movement away from higher education for the 
elite and a growing appreciation for the naturally gifted” (p. 55).
Second, the question of who should attend college: This question was 
answered by the large influx of veterans taking place at a time when “higher 
education was basically inhospitable to the adult student, and the possibility of 
millions of adult veterans descending on the nation’s campuses was daunting” 
(Rose, 1994, p. 47). As noted previously, some educators had feared that the
adult veterans would be a disruptive force and would not succeed in college, 
given their age and obsolete educational credentials. Instead, most veterans
were hardworking and mature, and their grades soon surpassed those of their
younger classmates—changing forever the perception of adult students. 
Therefore, contrary to the fears of the prominent educators of the day, “academic
levels did not fall; in many cases, they mounted. Older students uncovered a will
to study found in only the most serious of their younger classmates” (D. E.
Johnson, 1970, p. 227). President Conant of Harvard referred to the veterans as
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being “the most mature and promising students Harvard has ever had” (Bonner,
1986, p. 47). Neusner and Neusner (1995) write:
The Gl Bill brought a changing campus an entirely new kind of student—
middle class, not just upper class; Catholic, not just Protestant; children of
immigrant parents, not just children of long-established migrants. And the
campus presented a curriculum able to encompass the new classes of
students, not class-indoctrination in the knowledge, possession of which
would signify high class status (Latin, for example), but the education of
citizens able to ask tough questions—and answer them. (p. 45)
And, there were the married students: Prior to WW II, many colleges
prohibited enrollment by married students (Greenberg, 1994). Yet, over 50 
percent of the veterans attending college after the war were married, and of
these, half had one or more children while in college (Bonner, 1986).
Third, there was a significant reordering of higher education’s mission.
Historically, higher education had concentrated on the traditional professions of
medicine, law, the ministry, and teaching. Following World War II, emphasis was
instead placed on ‘high-level, occupational training’—management, engineering
and technical education. Kerr (1994) elaborates:
This was in response not only to student interests, but also to long-term
changes in the labor force. Jobs defined as ‘professional, managerial, and
technical’ increased from about 12 percent of the labor force in 1947, to
20 percent in 1970...Many new middle-class occupations were being
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created, and the GIs and their successors pursued them....However,
some other missions were comparatively neglected, including liberal
learning within a constructive environment for developmental growth, pure
learning, and evaluation of society, (p. 29).
The Gl Bill also had an unexpected benefit to American society: adult
education. “Adult education prior to World War II had been confined primarily to
minor avocational fields such as music appreciation, traveler’s French, etc.
Through this bill, adult education became the precursor of the Federal
government entering the general field of education— opening the way for later
Federal aid and intervention initiatives. The Gl Bill comprised an entirely new
approach to adult education” (Pacacha, 1976, p. 11).
D. E. Johnson (1970) credits the Gl Bill with catalyzing the development of
adult and continuing education, and it paved the way for the lasting and
significant Federal involvement in U.S. adult and higher education. “The
realization that mature people could enjoy and succeed in a more serious type of 
instruction brought about the great boom in adult education today” (p. 228). More
importantly to adult educators—for a few years, at least—adult education moved
from the margins of education to the center of education’s concerns. Issues
raised during this period gave new importance to the field and raised
expectations about its future direction and impacts. The influx of older students
on the nation’s college campuses validated the premise that adult students could
learn. In fact, the older students often out-performed more traditional students
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and made fewer demands on college administrators (Rose, 1994). “Veterans in 
college removed the stigma on married students, encouraged business and 
technical studies, made the federal government a presence on campus for the 
first time, and made the crowding of thousands of students into large campuses
a practical reality” (Bonner, 1986, p. 47).
Following the war, President Truman established the President’s
Commission on Higher Education to study the national needs for higher 
education. This committee drew heavily on higher education’s experiences with
the returning veterans. The commission’s 1947 report called for a huge 
peacetime program of help for college students, and recommended the doubling 
of college enrollments by 1960, locating community colleges ‘close to the
people’, and providing generous scholarships to offer opportunity and access—
encouraging every citizen to pursue education, both formal and informal, to the 
greatest extent possible according to one’s capacity. “For the first time in the 
world’s history an important public body had urged the extension of mass 
education to the university level” (Bonner, 1986, p. 47).
Freeland (1997) states the most controversial of the commission’s (also
known as the Zook Commission, headed by Dr. George Zook, president of the 
ACE) recommendations concerned the extension of mass education to the
university level such that by 1960 49% of the country’s eighteen to twenty-one
year-olds would receive at least two years of college and 32% would attend
postsecondary schooling for a full four years: “While arguing that these proposals
were consistent with recent trends and responded to needs made clear by the
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veteran’s program, the commission recognized that its ideas would appear to be 
revolutionary to many Americans. Less than 16% of the college-age population 
was receiving an advance degree in 1940 (p. 591).
The Zook Commission justified its recommendations on two grounds: 
First, it pointed out that current enrollments were artificially depressed by 
nonacademic barriers, including finances, regional variations in opportunity, and 
discrimination against religious and racial groups, especially Negroes and Jews. 
These inequities, the commission argued, “denied the nation the full talents of 
many citizens...The commission also criticized universities for focusing 
excessively on ‘verbal skills and intellectual interests’ and for ignoring ‘many 
other aptitudes—such as social sensibility and versatility, artistic ability, motor 
skills and dexterity, and mechanical aptitude and ingenuity” (Freeland, 1987, p. 
591-2). The commission also criticized the universities for past tendencies to 
stress specialized academic studies rather than fields of study relating to the
national interest (p. 596). However, “America was not ready. In the late 1940s
and early 1950s the nation soured on the idea of further actions by government
to increase educational opportunity” (Bonner, 1986, p. 47).
The National Science Foundation
At the end of World War II, the relationship of the federal government to
scientific research and development began to emerge as a significant issue: As 
many public and private leaders saw it, the crucial role that science had played
during the war pointed the way toward the role in which scientists and research
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could perform in strengthening the national defense, stimulate economic growth,
and provide a smooth transition to peacetime production (Rowan, 1985). “For 
many observers, the OSRD symbolized the benefits of cooperation between 
science and government and pointed the way toward a permanent postwar
union" (Rowan, 1985, p. 7).
Scientists, led by Vannevar Bush and his vanguard, sought to guarantee 
government support for basic research. He argued that basic research was the 
necessary foundation for a strong economy (Kleinman, p 188). The wartime 
experience led scientists, government officials, private leaders, and politicians to 
advocate various proposals for a government agency that could encourage and 
coordinate scientific research and training. “Through a process of compromise 
and modification these proposals resulted in the National Science Foundation
Act of 1950” (Rowan, 1985, p. 1).
One approach, most closely associated with Senator Harley Kilgore of 
West Virginia, would have allowed considerable government coordination and
planning within a public-private cooperation and power-sharing, an approach that 
emphasized the power of “democratic science” to reform and improve American
society. It stressed the need for public control and a program that would reform
patent policies, aid small businesses, insure an equitable distribution of research
funds, and break the monopoly that large research universities and corporations
had exercised over science and research during the war (Rowan, 1985). Not
surprisingly, “the efforts to create the National Science Foundation were driven
by an issue that throughout U. S. history has created division between the
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legislative and executive branches: executive prerogative. In this case, the
interest of elite scientists in controlling their own foundation meshed well with a
history of congressional fear of ceding too much power to the president, and,
indeed, presidential efforts to enhance the power of the president were certainly
fresh in the minds of legislators” (Kleinman, 1995, p. 141).
Senator Kilgore’s role in this debate is important from the perspective that
it was his subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, which, in
1942, opened an investigation of wartime mobilization. Although this
investigation helped to build support for a government role in research, it also
stimulated the vigorous debate over the nature of that role and the proper
relationship between government and private groups. The mobilization bills that
emerged from his subcommittee had New Deal characteristics in the form of
government controls that the military, the scientific elite, and various industrial
groups attacked as a step towards government regimentation and control of
science. These groups saw these bills as a threat to their control of science and
basic research (Rowan, 1985). Kilgore’s legislation owed much to a physicist on
the staff of his subcommittee on war mobilization, Herbert Schimmel, whose
beliefs about government and the economy had been shaped by personal
hardships during the Great Depression and by what he saw, while war came, as
the continuing failure of American industry to subordinate private profit-taking to
the national interest (England, 1982).
A second approach was identified with Vannevar Bush, who had been the
principal administrator of wartime research as the chairman of the OSRD: “His
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wartime experience convinced him that the integrity of science would not 
inevitably be compromised by federal subsidies for university research and that 
they would be needed to meet the nation’s requirements for new knowledge” 
(England, 1982, p. 5). Bush’s approach emphasized placing control of the new 
agency and its funds in the hands of the scientific vanguard or elite, as was the
case with the OSRD and its predecessor organizations before and during the
war. Thus, his approach largely ignored Kilgore’s call for government
coordination and economic reform, and instead pointed in the direction more
amenable to the established research network whose members believed that
government support of science must not involve political controls that could
threaten special interests or professional values (Rowan, 1985).
This new agency would grant public subsidies with little government
direction, interference, and coordination. However, by mid-1944, Bush and most
of public and private leaders recognized the practical necessity of some sort of
government involvement in postwar science and were prepared to concede the
government a role that went beyond the provision of financial support. The key
question revolved around the extent of government involvement (Rowan, 1985).
In the middle of this debate, during the mid and late 1940s, was the
Truman presidency, government agencies, and the military. The Truman
administration wanted the proposed agency to be within the framework of the
government, welcoming any role that it might play in coordinating the work of
existing research agencies. The military wanted to continue its wartime
relationships with the scientific community and recognized the value of
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subsidizing basic research; but it and other government identities feared external 
meddling with their operations. Corporate and industrial research interests
shared the viewpoint of the military’s position, but worried about political control. 
Most scientists and large research universities backed the Bush approach, while
the smaller colleges and medium-sized universities outside the established
research network generally supported a more democratic approach advocated
by Senator Kilgore. “These differing opinions combined with political
circumstances, the Cold War stimulus to military research, and bureaucratic
wrangling to determine the ultimate outcome of the NSF campaign” (Rowan,
1985, p. 3).
Given the ongoing political bickering regarding what form the new agency 
should take and the failure of the original NSF legislation to pass in both the
Senate (S. 1850) and the House (H.R. 6448), President Truman, in October of
1946, issued an executive order that established a President’s Scientific
Research Board (PSRB). The PSRB comprised all of the heads of all federal
agencies involved in scientific work, and served a purpose similar to that of the
OSRD in terms of scientific policy review, study, and the development of
recommendations to the President. The creation of the PSRB was viewed as
“groundwork for the reintroduction of NSF legislation and as a valuable means of
coordinating the government’s current scientific efforts” (Kleinman, 1995, p. 123).
Previously in that same year, and in anticipation of the elimination of the OSRD,
the Secretary of the War and Navy, the predecessor to the present Department
of Defense, established the Joint Research and Development Board (JRDB) to
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coordinate military-related research activities. Not surprisingly, Vannevar Bush 
was selected as the Board’s first chairman. In 1947, the National Security Act
created the Research and Development Board to replace the JRDB; Bush 
served as its chair until October 1948; he was replaced by Karl Compton
(Kleinman, 1995).
The new Senate version of the NSF bill (S. 247) was released from
committee to the Senate floor in February 1950, where it was approved; and it 
passed a House vote in March of that same year (Kleinman, 1995). Final 
passage of the act came in April 1950 (Lomask, 1975). The NSF Act of 1950 
directed the NSF to support basic research, award scholarships and fellowships, 
assist in the funding of defense research when requested by the Department of 
Defense; develop and encourage a national policy promoting basic research and 
education in the sciences; evaluate research programs of the federal 
government and correlate them to other public and private research; and, 
maintain a register of scientific and technical personnel (Kleinman, 1995).
To some degree, the act was a partial victory for Senator Kilgore: the
president would select the director of the foundation, not the board he appointed
to run the foundation. The bill virtually assured that the organization would be
dominated by science elites—totally absent from the language of the bill was any 
suggestion that the organization would present a broad cross-section of social 
interest as Kilgore had suggested in his earlier legislation (Kleinman, 1995). Nor 
was there any language in the act that gave the NSF responsibility for assessing
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the impact of research on public welfare, as Kilgore had clearly envisioned in his
early legislation (p. 154).
The final version of National Science Foundation legislation was
significantly influenced by Bush’s ideas and promoted by Karl Compton, who had
become the head of the Research and Development Board. It allowed
considerable private power within a public-private framework, emphasized basic
research and advanced scientific training, stressed support for what Bush
frequently referred to as the ‘best science’, and provided the autonomous control
that advocates of the original Bush plan had always sought (Rowan, 1985).
Though the fight to establish the NSF was a long and difficult one, the 
struggle for its operating budget became just as challenging in an era of federal 
budget cutbacks. It was created with an appropriation of $500,000 and $15 
million annually thereafter. When, in 1952, the NSF submitted a budget of $14 
million, the House initially attempted to drastically cut its request to $3,000,000.
In the end, a House-Senate conference committee compromised on $3.5 million, 
down from the Senate’s recommended $6.3 million (Rowan, 1985). However,
according to Lomask (1975), in 1955 the Foundation began administering the
funds, $43.5 million in all, that Congress had sanctioned to help finance the 
nation’s participation in the International Geophysical Year (IGY), a world-wide
venture. For 18 months, beginning in July of 1957, some 30,000 scientists and
technicians from 66 nations cooperated in a study of the earth (p. 137).
Budgeting restrictions severely limited the scope of research projects it
could fund and delayed the implementation of science training, scholarship, and
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fellowship programs. The summer of 1957 in particular was a season of 
discontent for the NSF. Government budgetary retrenchment, in which the NSF 
shared, made it more difficult to recruit and hold first-rate talent (England, 1982). 
Appropriations for the NSF would not appreciably increase until the Soviet 
Union’s launching of the Sputnik in October of 1957 (Rowan, 1985).
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Section V:
CRAFTING A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR 
EDUCATION, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
Most Americans greeted the end of World War II with relief, anticipated a 
period of relative peace, and had expectations of economic improvement and 
increased prosperity. Instead, the decade following the war was one of 
uncertainty and characterized by crises both at home and abroad.
Federal education legislation during this time frame was initially stimulated 
by the nation’s fixation on education as a response to a Cold War emergency, 
brought on by the launching of Sputnik, and in reaction to forces of social and 
technological change working in America. The expansion in the science training 
role of the National Science Foundation and passage of the National Defense 
Education Act (NDEA) of 1958 represented the first critical milestones in federal
education-related efforts that attempted to find solutions to those events, needs,
and concerns by directly funding the nation’s schools and universities.
National and International Crises Erupts
During the 1940s and 1950s, Progressive Education was the conventional 
wisdom of the educational field from kindergarten through teachers colleges 
(Clowse, 1981). Urban and Wagoner (2000) state that “pedagogical
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progressivism, at least the versions such as Dewey’s or Young’s that shared 
much of their agenda with liberal progressivism,” had already began to recede in 
influence after the 1920s (p. 245). “While few schools were wholeheartedly 
committed to progressivism,...curriculum decisions were almost always the result 
of local conditions and the schools’ interaction with local leadership” (p. 269).
Among these conditions were the Great Depression and resulting impacts on
school finances, conservative teachers’ unions, and the resistance of teachers
“to change their traditional roles” (p. 274-279).
As the country emerged from the war, its schools generally showed more
continuity than change when compared to the prior two decades. The basic
curriculum remained unaltered, as did administrative structures and school
governance, teacher training, classroom teaching practices, and most 
educational polices (Urban and Wagoner, 2000). It would be the major crises 
that emerged during the 1954-1957 period that would belie the standard picture 
of the post-World War II years as being a period of relative domestic tranquility, 
and would project educational policy into the forefront of national politics and as
a critical element in America’s response to another national emergency: the
advent of the civil rights era, Sputnik, and the continuing debates over
educational priorities (Urban and Wagoner, 2000).
The year 1957, in particular, would be one in which Americans began to
face a variety of unsettling concerns in the national and international arenas. On
the domestic front, President Eisenhower and Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus
deadlocked over implementation of school desegregation in Little Rock’s Central
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High School. Previously, the court-approved plans for the desegregation of the
high school had proceeded smoothly, with the admission of a selected group of 
Negro children. Though mild in his initial reaction to the court decision, Governor 
Faubus retreated from this moderate stance and opted not to break from the 
ranks of the Southern governors who were opposed to school desegregation.
Eisenhower would have preferred to stay aloof from the school desegregation
process, initiated by the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954) decision. 
Yet, Faubus’ defiance pushed the president into making a decision when, on the 
court-appointed date for desegregation, Faubus ordered the Arkansas National 
Guard to prevent the court’s plan from being implemented. President Eisenhower 
then became a key, if unwilling, leading participant in this drama when he 
immediately dispatched federal troops and nationalized the Arkansas National 
Guard to enforce desegregation at the high school (Copper v. Aaron, 358 U. S., 
1958; Clowse, 1981; Urban and Wagoner, 2000).
Brown, as described by Urban and Wagoner (2000), was an unusual 
decision involving an issue of educational policy and practice that had effects 
that were felt both inside and outside of the nation’s schools: “It may have been 
one of the few occasions in our history when an educational policy was the 
catalyst for substantial changes in social relations and policies outside the
schools” (p. 288-9). In 1957, Congress passed a civil rights law that placed it on
the side of racial equity, though the law was mild in terms of its intent and 
approach to the issue of school desegregation (Urban and Wagoner, 2000).
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Late Friday afternoon, October 4, 1957, from Moscow came word that an 
artificial satellite had been launched by the Soviet Union. Clowse (1981) provides
the following observation:
The Soviet news agency Tass called the device Sputnik, a Russian
nickname for ‘Artificial Fellow Traveler Around the Earth.’ The world’s first
man-made satellite and its instrument package, weighing 184 pounds,
were circulating the earth once every ninety-six minutes. In Washington,
the news of the Sputnik had reached the Soviet embassy while a party
honoring scientists in the IGY program was in progress. Applause broke
out among the scientists, who congratulated their Soviet colleagues on
the achievement. Over the next few weeks, however, the event did not
seem quite so fortuitous as all of its implications sank into popular
consciousness, (p.6)
“This satellite represented a tremendous breakthrough in space research”
(Dent, 1969, p. 144). It was apparent that the Russians had made a coup in an
area where many Americans presumed continuing superiority, the application of
scientific research to technological production. For instance, the Sputnik satellite
was eight times heavier than a satellite that the U. S. planned to launch into orbit
as part of the International Geophysical Year (IGY), the Sputnik’s three-stage
rocket was nearly twenty times more powerful than the IGY-Vanguard rocket,
though the nation did have more powerful rockets available. President
Eisenhower had decided to separate and conceal military advances in rocket
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technology from the scientific IGY project (Clowse, 1981). Before the U. S. could
respond with a successful satellite launch of its own, on November 3 the Soviets 
performed an even more astounding feat when Sputnik II blasted into orbit. It
weighed 1,120 pounds and carried a dog, wired for medical monitoring.
Americans began to face the prospect that the Russians were preparing to send
a man into space, leaving America far behind in the space race (Clowse, 1981).
The Soviet Union’s success in launching the first Sputnik in 1957
produced a peculiar and definite mixture of depression and panic in America that
lasted for months. The public mood was one of expecting the national
government to take quick action to correct the conditions that allowed the
country to suffer such a scientific and technological defeat at the hands of the
Soviet Union (Clowse, 1981). Though the United States responded with a
successful satellite launch of its own just four months following the first Sputnik
that success did not take place until after the humiliation of an unsuccessful
launch painfully witnessed by many Americans on their television sets (Urban
and Wagoner, 2000). The U. S. successfully launched a Explorer I satellite in
January of 1958 (Dent, 1969).
With the successful launch of Sputnik, a consensus grew that the nation’s 
educational institutions were largely to blame for this Cold War defeat. By the
late 1950s, America had come to believe that its survival was under threat from
international Communism. The successful launching of Sputniks, the Earth’s first
artificial satellites, gave the perceived threat shocking tangibility and raised it to
crisis proportions. Americans began to feel that their education system had failed
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them, the Soviet Union was superior in science, mathematics, and technology 
development; and, that America was on the verge of losing the Cold War and in
the preparation of scientists (Dent, 1969; Clowse, 1981).
That Americans blamed their system of education is not surprising:
Americans had become more and more accustomed to viewing education in the
context of the then existing Cold War ideology. In the spring of 1957, for
example, President Eisenhower had addressed a meeting of the National 
Education Association (NEA) and stated that the nation’s schools “are
strongpoints in our National Defense...more important than Nike batteries, more
necessary than our radar warning nets, and more powerful even than the energy
of the atom” (Clowse, 1981, p. 27).
As a more immediate response to the Sputnik launch and the criticism of
his administration that followed, President Eisenhower appointed a full-time
science advisor to the White House staff and sought to implement programs to
persuade more youngsters to enter national-security related fields, thus
establishing a linkage of scientific achievement to education. Previously, in 1955,
his administration had debated the ramifications of a possible shortage of
scientists and engineers. If proved true, such a shortage would have implications
for the Cold War as well as education. Meanwhile, the American Council on
Education (ACE), an influential voice for higher education institutions, related the
Soviet success to a lack of interest in and financial support for American
education (Clowse, 1981).
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Most detractors claimed that reformist approaches to schooling had failed
to equip students with the skills essential to an educated person, given that it
was too concerned with social development and oriented around life adjustment.
Others saw America’s educational lapses in relationship to the Cold War: by
allowing students to shun tough courses, they argued, educators were to blame
for shortages in fields vital to national security. This argument increased in its
dimensions after 1955 when it became widely known that the Soviet Union
graduated more scientists and engineers than the United States (Clowse, 1981).
Leaders such as Dr. Edward Teller, Father of the H-Bomb, and Admiral
Hyman Rickover, Father of the Nuclear Submarine, spoke out frequently,
invoking long-standing educational criticism to explain why the U. S. was behind
in the space race. Critics such as these claimed that Progressive Education,
flabby educational curricula, and the shirking of basic subjects were robbing 
America of competent, trained manpower. Sputnik launches that year were
perceived by many in America as not only a defeat in the Cold War, but as a
judgment upon the goals and values of American education (Clowse, 1981).
Rickover was an early advocate of federal financial assistance to
education, the imposition of national standards, national testing, and special
educational opportunities for gifted students; and, he was a formidable friend of
education and devoted inordinate amounts of time to scourging politicians for
their neglect of education. He decried the American tradition of local control over
education, which he felt left the direction of educational policy in the hands of
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thousands of citizens who “seldom qualify as educational experts” (Clowse,
1981, p. 35).
Furthermore, in his book Education and Freedom, Rickover (1959)
expressed the opinion that John Dewey’s insistence on practical learning and
children’s interests had led to inferior intellectual training in the United States:
The kind of school which prepares young people adequately for life in a
less complicated environment is of little use today. Nor do we need
schools that concentrate primarily on adjusting the children of immigrants
to this new country; on helping them become Americans quickly and
painlessly. Today we must have schools which develop in all children—
talented, average, and below average—the highest level of intellectual
competence of which they are capable; schools that help young people to
understand the complex world of today and how it came to be what it is.
This means that our schools must return to the traditional task of formal
education in Western civilization—transmission of the nation’s cultural
heritage, and preparation for life through rigorous training of young minds
to think clearly, logically, and independently, (p. 17-18)
Rickover states further that “apart from the life-adjustment fallacy so
prevalent among American educationists, our schools seem unable to
concentrate on training young minds because of partiality for so-called ‘useful’
knowledge” (Rickover, 1959, p. 24).
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The target of the critics, such as Arthur Bestor, in reality, was “life 
adjustment education” that grew out of the reform literature during the immediate 
post-World War II years and was promoted most notably by Charles Prosser, a 
noted vocational educator. This curricular approach was intended to serve what
he referred to as “the un-served middle 60% of students in high school” for whom
neither college preparatory, nor vocational, courses adequately prepared them 
for modern society. “The long-term decline of traditional academic subjects that
seemed to culminate with the life adjustment movement of the later 1940s was
startling” (Urban and Wagoner, 2000, p. 291).
Bestor argued that life adjustment education shortchanged students by 
preventing them from having contact with challenging academic studies, forced 
colleges and universities to deal with generally unprepared students, and society 
would be saddled with “a youth cohort that was unversed in academic knowledge
and skills and thus unprepared to meet the intellectual and civic challenges of
the twentieth century” (Urban and Wagoner, p. 292). Bestor also called upon
schools to restore what he called ‘basic education’ to its rightful place in the
classroom and to raise “up a nation of men and women highly literate, accurately
informed, and rigorously trained in the process of rational and critical thought.”
Otherwise, he said, “the country could never hope to deal with the complexities
of the postwar period” (Clowse, 1981, p. 32-3).
Howard Meyerhoff, the executive secretary of the Scientific Manpower 
Commission, cited the lack of excellence in schooling as a denial of opportunity
to the individual and a threat to the nation’s security. Moreover, he felt that
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priority should go to improving science instruction at all levels of schooling or to 
funding advance research that might prove crucial in waging the Cold War
(Clowse, 1981).
Although it certainly caught the attention of America and provided 
ammunition for critics of the nation’s schools, according to Kaestle and Smith 
(1982) “the Sputnik achievement was not the product of a superior school 
system; nor did it take a technological embarrassment to move academic critics
of American progressive education into the spotlight....The United States
launched Explorer I within four months of Sputnik, although the American
manned-satellite program had begun years after the Soviet’s” (p. 392).
Challenges Facing Federal Aid and Educational Reform Advocates
Sputnik, and America’s reaction to it, provided a much-needed impetus to 
a growing movement in support of federal aid to education. Clowse (1981)
writes:
Once the Sputnik panic became an educational crisis, it coalesced with
the long and hitherto inauspicious struggle for federal aid to education. A
significant breakthrough had eluded advocates of federal aid in the
postwar era....The Sputnik crisis transformed the politics of federal aid to
education; it altered the terms of the debate and temporarily neutralized
much of the opposition. The cold war rivalry seemed to dictate that the
nation mobilize her brainpower, including schoolchildren and
undergraduate and graduate students, on an emergency basis, (p. 3)
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Previously, while the federal government had provided land grants for
schools and aid to vocational education and school construction, bills to provide
general funds to education were routinely defeated. “Education did not 
necessarily carry negative connotations; but federal support for it was not 
politically popular. Improvement of education was not yet considered to be a 
worthy national goal” (Harden, 1981, p. 6). Many in education had long favored 
general federal aid to the states. “Such aid, it was contended, would leave states 
and local communities free to use the funds for whatever instructional purposes
they saw fit” (Krug, 1966, p. 141).
Complicating the debate over education, and the implementation of 
reforms and financial aid, were several important factors and potential obstacles:
The first of these was the baby boom that was under way. It was projected that
44 million students would enter the nation’s elementary and high schools by
1965, straining already inadequate facilities. Furthermore, during the war, 
educators had begun to abandon their profession for higher paying jobs in the 
private sector, and the trend was expected to continue, creating a deficiency in
numbers and qualifications. Second, the fiscal basis of American education
seemed paltry, given the tradition of local control meant that financing of public
education came largely from real estate taxes (Clowse, 1981).
Connected with this was a third issue: control. Any aid from the federal
government was presumed to bring some form of control. Kaestle and Smith
(1982) provide the following insight:
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The overriding issue in the support and control of elementary and 
secondary education since 1940 has been the role of the federal 
government. One might reason that the increasing role of the national 
government in public education is only an extension of the same historical 
processes that led to the creation of state school systems....However, a 
notion persists that public educational responsibilities is constitutionally
reserved to the states, (p. 384-5)
Fourth, the tradition of separation of church and state: private schools 
might be able to share in financial assistance to education if unrestricted aid 
flowed to the states, as some educational aid advocates had proposed. If this 
occurred, Congress could not institute a blanket prohibition against federal aid to 
private schools without violating the principle of local control (Clowse, 1981).
Fifth, there was the increasingly tense issue of school desegregation.
“The Supreme Court’s monumental ruling in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 
ordering an end to segregation in public schools based on race, marked the 
beginning of the federal government’s active involvement in education” (Russo, 
2001, p. 46). Those fighting to retain segregated school saw federal aid as a
potential weapon of integration (Clowse, 1981).
Prior to 1958, federal aid to education advocates had focused on three
devices for channeling funds to education: aid for construction, unrestricted 
grants to the states, and revenue from tidelands oil (Clowse, 1981). For example, 
in 1987, the first session alone of the 85th Congress witnessed approximately
100
100 bills to authorize direct or indirect federal assistance (Kerr-Tener, 1987).
None of the devices of federal aid advocates fared well on Capital Hill:
As of 1950, the only federal aid to elementary and secondary education 
was for vocational education (about $28 million), school lunches (about 
$92 million), federal dependents (about $29 million), and native American 
children (about $15 million). Furthermore, the Congress continued to 
resist arguments for general aid to local school systems, despite lobbying 
by such groups as the NEA. The federal research effort in education was 
tiny, and the federal courts had little impact on local schooling. (Kastle and
Smith, 1982)
Thus, the principal means of offering federal funds continued to be
through schools districts qualifying as federally impacted areas or when an
individual veteran qualified for the Gl Bill (Clowse, 1981). No long term, general 
federal aid and involvement in educational matters occurred during this time 
frame (Munger and Fenno, 1962). “Federal programs initiated in the successive 
national emergencies of the Depression and World War II were considered
temporary and affected elementary and secondary schooling only indirectly”
(Kaestle and Smith, 1982, p. 389)
The Eisenhower administration was yet another challenge for educational
advocates. Eisenhower’s overall record in office can be characterized by the fact
he generally sought to restrain domestic change; his record in the area of federal
aid to education was no exception. However, “as modern presidents go, Dwight
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Eisenhower was better versed in educational maters than most. He arrived at the
White House with two years’ experience as president of Columbia University and 
as a member of the prestigious Educational Policies Commission. He also 
availed himself of the counsel of distinguished private educators (including 
Harvard University president John Conant and, of course, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, 
president of Johns Hopkins) and made himself regularly available to education 
advisors within the administration” (Kerr-Tener, 1987, p. 473-4).
Eisenhower’s administration would sponsor the first White House 
Conference on Education in 1955 and, following Harry Truman’s example, and 
appoint a public higher education commission (the Committee on Education 
Beyond High School) chaired by Devereux Josephs, a former Carnegie 
Corporation president (Kerr-Tener, 1987). However, Eisenhower had taken office 
in 1954 without much commitment to federal aid. Although his administration 
sponsored bills to provide construction loans and grants to education in 1955, 
1956, and 1957—Eisenhower demanded that aid be temporary, strictly
contingent upon need, a stimulus to state funding, and was careful to ensure that
various protective language and devices were written into aid legislation to ward
off the potential for federal controls (Clowse, 1981). Kerr-Tener (1987) states:
It is well known that Eisenhower found little to commend in Democratic-
sponsored bills for public school construction aid. His strategy for
responding to these perennial initiatives was to offer his own modest,
‘emergency’ aid bills partly as alternatives— and partly as foils— to the
opposition’s more expensive proposals. This strategy usually produced
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deadlock because of longstanding inter- and intra-party divisions on the 
school aid question, (p. 473)
Nevertheless, and contrary to assertions regarding his opposition to most 
Democratic proposals on this issue, “Eisenhower was not irretrievably 
uninterested in using federal means to aid education. By official lights, including 
those of a White House aide who worked on education issues and high-ranking 
HEW [the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare] officers, Eisenhower
was cautious about federal involvement in the financing of education but was
also open to reasoned argument” (p. 474).
The Eisenhower Administration, and its approach to aid for higher 
education, likewise reflected the mood of restraining aid to education. The 
Committee on Education Beyond High School saw no need for federal help to 
college students as recommended by the Zook Commission. No comprehensive 
plan for higher education was developed or desired, and colleges conducted 
themselves much as they did before the war. However, in the 1950’s it was 
recognized that returning GIs influenced higher education in yet another way: the
Committee in 1956 gave wide publicity to a projection that the postwar births
would cause college enrollments to double and perhaps triple by 1970.
Furthermore, the Committee predicted that there would be an increased demand
for technical and scientific education in the 1950s that would outstrip the ability of
America’s higher education to cope with it. “Nevertheless, for all of the urgency
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of the...committee report, the nation was in no hurry to respond to its
recommendations” (Bonner, 1986, p. 47-8).
Congress and the Eisenhower administration had considered a number of
approaches to federal aid to education prior to Sputnik, but there is no doubt that
the Soviet space successes had galvanized American politicians into action on
the educational front (Urban and Wagoner, 2000). And, advocates of federal aid
to education had found a way to link education to national security (Clowse,
1981). The advocates of the NDEA tied the act’s federal aid to the national
defense effort, thereby disarming much of the conservative opposition to the 
measure: “The most effective argument for federal educational aid at the time 
was that the Soviets were dangerously close to a superiority in science and 
technology, and perhaps in other fields as well. Thus, federal aid was a way to 
help America close the gap” (Urban and Wagoner, 2000, p. 296).
“The most significant educational consequence of Sputnik, even more
important in the long run than the attention paid to academic studies, was the 
impetus it gave to federal financing of public education” (Urban and Wagoner,
2000, p. 293). Though Sputnik produced interest in the federal role in education,
its importance to the nation’s educational policymaking process revolves around
the fact it disarmed opposition to federal aid per se and to the specific provisions
of two bills leading to the passage of the National Defense Education Act of 1958
(Clowse, 1981).
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Developing Brainpower for the Cold War: The Politics of
Linkage and the National Defense Education Act of 1958
“The successful Soviet launchings, as contrasted with the slow and only 
partially successful U. S. efforts, led to some unexpected consequences in 
American educational circles. The first of these was the passage of the 1958
National Defense Education Act” (Urban and Wagoner, 2000, p. 295).
During 1957, in the wake of the successful Sputnik launches and 
stimulated by personal meetings with the nation’s leading scientists and a July 
1957 report of Josephs’ Committee, Eisenhower had expressed his interest in
issues associated with shortcomings in math and science education with HEW 
Secretary Marion Folsom and his Assistant Secretary Elliot Richardson. The 
report, which was highlighted by its “doleful commentary on the state of graduate 
education and the shortage of topflight college instructors,” provided a
springboard for the Administration’s consideration of new higher education 
program and led to the creation of a small HEW departmental task force to 
evaluate the committee’s recommendations (Kerr-Tener, 1987, p. 475). The task
force’s objective was to develop legislation for submission at the opening of the
January 1958 congressional session. The October 1957 news of the successful
Sputnik launch gave a boost to the work of the task force and increased the
prospects that its proposals would not only be regarded as educationally sound,
but also politically justified and necessary (Kerr-Tener, 1987).
The task force’s proposals included a generous need- and merit-based
scholarship provision, graduate fellowships, and federal matching grants to
105
universities for expanding graduate-level programs. Eisenhower demanded that
the proposals also include support for improved high school teaching of math 
and science, aid to colleges for constructing science and technical teaching 
facilities, and a college scholarship provision for study in defense related fields 
(Kerr-Tener, 1987). “While the bulk of the task force’s proposals had undergone
a long incubation period prior to being pressed into service, there is no doubt
that the events of July and October, 1957 hastened their political coming of age” 
(Kerr-Tener, p. 482). “The Sputnik crisis finally created a political environment in
which an enlarged federal role was viable” (Freeland, 1997, p. 602).
The general provisions of the NDEA articulated the Cold War motives of
Congress and the Eisenhower administration: “To strengthen the national 
defense and to encourage and assist in the expansion and improvement of 
educational programs to meet critical national needs; and for other purposes” 
(Committee on Labor and Public Welfare [CLPW], 1958, p.23). Congress
declared “that an educational emergency exists and requires action by the
federal government. Assistance will come from Washington to help develop as
rapidly as possible those skills essential to the national defense” (Clowse, 1981,
p. 162). Thus, for the first time the federal government gave direct help to
education and greatly increased funds for research, though the new aid was
targeted only to areas of study central to the nation’s defense. The bill “was a
clear response to specific national needs...” (Bonner, 1986, p. 48).
The NDEA more than doubled federal expenditures for education, 
authorizing the Office of Education to administer much of the NDEA with $4
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billion over a four-year period with an initial appropriation of $115.3 million. For
higher education this included funding for federal student loans programs,
graduate fellowships in science and engineering, institutional aid for teacher
education, funding for capital construction, and a surge of funds for curriculum
development in K-12 and higher education for the sciences, math, and foreign
languages (CLPW, 1958). Special consideration for student loans was
recommended for those with superior academic backgrounds. For those who
became science, math, engineering, or foreign language teachers, parts or all of 
their NDEA-sponsored loans were canceled (Krug, 1966).
The NDEA also provided funds for technological, audiovisual, and media 
services; and, added funds to existing vocational legislation to improve the
education of technicians (Urban and Wagoner, 2000). These provisions of the
NDEA include:
• Title III of the NDEA provided financial assistance to the state
educational agencies for strengthening science, mathematics, and 
modern language instruction at the elementary and secondary 
levels. This assistance also provided grants and loans to nonprofit
private schools to acquire or remodel laboratory and other facilities,
obtain special equipment, etc. that would be suitable for use in
providing education in science, mathematics, or foreign languages.
(CLPW, 1958)
• Title VII of the NDEA authorized the Commissioner of Education,
assisted by the Advisory Committee on New Educational Media in
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the Office of Education, to make grants to public and nonprofit 
private agencies and to individuals, or through contracts, to study
the need for increased and more effective uses of television, radio,
motion pictures and related media for educational purposes; and 
foster new audiovisual techniques for teaching (CLPW, 1958). In
addition, Title VII authorized the NSF to provide a representative
for the aforementioned Advisory Committee on New Educational
Media. Twelve other representatives were to come from the 
communications media, elementary and secondary fields, and 
higher education. (Clowse, 1981)
• Title VIII of the NDEA served to amend the Vocational Education
Act (the George-Barden Act) of 1946 to authorize grants to states
to assist them in training individuals for employment as “highly
skilled technicians in occupations requiring scientific knowledge in
field necessary for the national defense” (CLPW, 1958, p. 7). The
purpose of this provision was to meet the needs of national 
defense by increasing funds allocated for the training of technicians
in the areas of science and technology. The states would receive
funds on the same basis of allocation as specified in the George-
Barden Act. (Clowse, 1981)
• Title IX provided for the creation of a Science Information Service
“to provide for more effective dissemination of scientific
information...and to provide for the development of new or
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improved methods, including mechanized systems, for making this
information available, and to establish an advisory body called the
Science Information Council.” Both organizations created by this
title were to be established and supervised by the NSF (CLPW,
1958, p. 21).
Federal funds from the NDEA program were distributed to the states on
the basis of school population, and for the acquisition of educational materials for 
specific subjects mentioned above, the NDEA provided funds had to be matched 
by local school expenditures. Later the program was enhanced to include
education materials for the instruction of history, civics, geography, English,
language arts, and the humanities (Dent, 1981).
The NDEA also aroused some controversy: By associating the NDEA
funds with national defense needs, Congress partially responded to many people
who had feared that with federal funds would come excessive government
control over schools. Though eventually people would find that these fears were
unfounded, for several years acceptance of NDEA funds was withheld by some
school systems. Another aspect of the NDEA that caused considerable
consternation was a provision in the act that required faculties of schools and
institutions of higher education applying for funds were required to sign a
patriotic loyalty oath before the dispersal of funds could be approved. Several
universities contested the constitutionality of this provision and urged Congress
to amend the act to discontinue this requirement. “Despite these various
objections, however, most schools welcomed financial aid from NDEA...it was
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the first legislation for substantial federal aid to education to be passed in many 
years” (Dent, 1981). Congress finally relented, and in 1962 repealed the loyalty
oath provision (Clowse, 1981).
In 1958, Congress also passed a law to require the NSF to manage the
federal research programs on weather modifications. This legislation and the
National Defense Education Act of 1958 had the result of enlarging the NSF’s
attempts to carry out its directive to diffuse scientific information among scientists
in the U.S. and friendly countries. Supplemented by an executive order in 1959,
the NSF dismantled its small information office and created a significantly
expanded office of Science Information Service (Lomask, 1975).
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Section VI:
THE EMERGENCE OF TECHNOLOGY IN 
EDUCATION AS MEDIA AND AUDIOVISUAL COMMUNICATIONS
Instructional strategies and methodologies developed during and after 
World War II evolved into the first, and one of the earliest views of technology in 
education, as media and audiovisual communications. It grew out of the visual 
instruction movement during the late nineteenth century and the audiovisual 
movement (introduced in Section I) that began in the 1930s, both as alternate
methods to books and lectures to deliver information. This movement continued
to evolve following the war, and converged with the new communications
movement— eventually becoming media and audiovisual communications, 
representing the tools and technologies to assist in the delivery of instruction in a 
more effective and efficient way to learners.
The Communications Movement and Models of Learning
During World War II, the visual instruction movement reached its maturity. 
When the war demanded rapid, effective training for both the armed services and 
wartime industries, visual materials were intensively used— aided by the
procedural and research data that had been compiled by civilian educators and
instructional designers. Following the war, visual instruction began to lose its
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distinct identity as a movement in American education and leaders of the 
movement became uneasy about the adequacy of the visual instruction label as 
the newer technologies such as audio recordings and radio entered into the 
equation. An impetus to this uneasiness came about in 1947 when the National 
Education Association’s Department of Visual Instruction (DVI) became the 
Department of Audiovisual Instruction (DAVI), signifying a changing of 
perspective. It was apparent that visual instruction was to begin moving toward a 
convergence with the broad mainstream of educational technology as it began to 
be replaced with a number of communications models of the instruction process
(Saettler, 1990).
Previously, during the 1920s and 1930s, mass communications theory 
began to emerge as media developed. This was a result of the need to 
systematically study and understand the impact communications— their content 
and functioning— had upon the mass society and what influences they might 
have on individuals and particular kinds of people. However, following the 
introduction of audio recordings and radio, communications had little influence on
the theories and practices of education-related technology until after the war
(Saettler, 1990).
The growth of instructional radio occurred primarily during the decade of 
1925-1935— during which the first courses in radio education were established 
at colleges and universities across the country. However, by the late 1930s and 
the advent of World War II, the growth period of educational radio had begun to
decline (Saettler, 1968).
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The advent of stringent federal regulation, the rise of national commercial 
networks, and their use of inexperienced faculty were the chief factors 
promoting their failure....However, there was another
consideration....Since the licensing authority had accepted the philosophy 
of commercial radio, no place was left for educational stations which had 
to withdraw when costly commercial standards were applied to their 
operations. Regardless of the explanations offered, it is clear that 
educators were generally apathetic toward educational broadcasting.
(Saettler, 1968, p. 295)
Meanwhile, as educational radio declined, instructional television brought 
about a general expansion of instructional technology. By the 1950s, television 
favorably impacted the communications movement and took center stage as a 
medium in education (Saettler, 1968). Molnar (1969) attributes the following 
statement to Edward R. Murrow: “This instrument [television] can teach, it can 
illuminate, yes it can even inspire. But it can only do so to the extent that humans 
are determined to use it to these ends. Otherwise it is merely lights and wires in
a box” (p. 59).
The first non-experimental educational television station was launched by
Iowa State University in 1950 (Newby et al., 2000). Following World War II,
instructional television was initiated on commercial stations because educational
stations were preoccupied with problems of financing, staffing, and developing 
programs for adult instructional use. In 1952, the Federal Communications
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Commission (FCC) set aside 242 television channels for public educational
television stations, spurring a growing interest in the use of television for
education. By the late fifties, instructional television was beginning to receive
serious attention from educators and educational broadcasters; and, during the
1960s courses geared to this medium were being taught by either open or
closed circuit television, on educational or commercial stations, and in
educational institutions (Saettler, 1968).
In 1958, Congress passed the NDEA Act. Though the principal aims of
the NDEA were to provide federal funds for the promotion of science,
mathematics, and foreign language instruction; improved testing and high school 
counseling, and to finance loans and scholarships for under-financed college
students— another objective of the act was the distribution of funds to extend the 
use of audiovisual materials in teaching and to expand vocational training. This 
led to large increases, across the country, in purchases of audiovisual equipment
and related materials (Dent, 1981).
During the postwar period and through the early years of the Cold War,
the NDEA Act played a key role in the emergence of instructional technology and
its wide spread application in the nation’s schools and institutions of higher
education. The role and leadership of states increased in advancing the use of
audiovisual media, which experienced steady growth following the war—
reflecting the growth of teacher education requirements and the budgeting of 
considerable sums for the purchase of audiovisual materials and equipment 
(Saettler, 1990).
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In higher education, a trend was established whereby the audiovisual 
center became a resource center or centralized administrative organization for 
educational media services, as well as research for the study of media in the 
teaching-learning process. Much of the impetus in this effort was stimulated by 
appropriations from the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) and by support 
from private foundations such as the Ford Foundation (Saettler, 1968).
As instructional media use increased after the passage of the NDEA, the 
field continued to change and mature. Media specialists became important 
members of the educational community, interest grew in new forms of media 
technology; and media itself came to be viewed not in isolation, but as one part 
of a larger instructional technology process. “As instructional design developed 
into a field of study, media science matured in ways that increasingly 
acknowledged its link to instructional design and communications” (Newby et al, 
2000, p. 250).
During the 1950s, the educational media field began to shift its focus from 
hardware to the role of media in learning. The instructional theories or models of
the postwar time period initially focused on the communications process, and the
authors of these models indicated that in planning for instruction it was
necessary to consider all of the elements of the communications process and not 
just focus on the medium, as many in the audiovisual field had a tendency to do 
(Heinich et al., 1989). “These models helped to move audiovisual specialists to
consider all of the components involved in the communications process. As a
result, audiovisual studies began to be conceptualized as something broader
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than just media. A convergence of audiovisual sciences, communications 
theories, learning theories, and instructional design began” (Newby et al., 2000,
p. 249). Saettler (1990) writes:
The concrete-abstract continuums of visual instruction began to be 
replaced with a number of communications models of the instructional
process....By the early 1950s, the ‘audiovisual instruction’ had begun to
be replaced by ‘audiovisual communications.’ Emphasis began to shift 
from the ‘things’ of the instructional situation to the complete 
communications process involved in transmitting information from a 
source (a teacher) to a receiver (the learner), (p. 167)
Molnar (1969) argues that the promise of educational technology brings
benefits to both the teacher and the learner:
The promise of educational media rests upon the premise that technology
can provide a mechanical or electronic advantage which will permit
educators to teach more students for less while maintaining or even
improving the quality of education. The objective has not been to replace
the teacher with a machine but to free the teacher from the routine
administrative functions, the monitoring of drill and practice and the simple
presentation of factual information. Once freed from these chores it was
hoped that the teacher would have more time to interact with students on
an individual basis and to devote more time to higher order conceptual
and affective learning, (p. 53)
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Systematic studies were undertaken to determine how the attributes or
features of various media affected learning. In the process, various theories or
models of communications were developed that incorporated the role of media, 
helping to move audiovisual specialists to consider all components in the 
communications process as they were being applied to education. As a result, 
audiovisual studies began to be conceptualized as something more than just
media (Newby et al., 2000).
By the end of the 1950s, the aforementioned convergence had failed to 
take root and gain widespread acceptance in education. Despite the significant 
implications of communications theory and research, and the fact educational 
circumstances of the time were favorable to the application of mass media or a 
technology of mass media, in practice little use was made of the convergence of 
communications and the audiovisual movement. Saettler (1990) states:
Aside from the usual resistance of educational institutions and teachers to
new ways or means of communicating, the primary reason that 
educational technology did not incorporate communications within its
conceptual framework to any great degree is that behaviorism began to
exert its influence in the early 1960s, just about the time that 
communication was beginning to have some impact on educational
technology, (p. 277)
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Perspectives On the Beginnings of the Science of Instruction
According to Saettler (1968), modern day instructional technology finds its
definition and earliest roots involved with a consideration of at least two
concepts: “the physical science, or media, concept and the behavioral science 
concept. Although often functionally interrelated, each is an outgrowth of 
different theoretical notions, and each viewpoint holds important implications for
learning and instruction” (p. 1).
The view of educational technology, during its early stages as visual 
instruction (and later as audiovisual communications), had traditionally been 
primarily concerned with a physical science concept— the use of specific media 
and as a small, specialized movement almost completely separated from the
mainstream of educational technology. This concept usually involved the
application of physical science and technology, such as film projectors, audio
and video recorders, and television for group presentations of instructional
materials. The concept viewed media as tools or aids to instruction and tended to
be more concerned with the effects of the various instructional devices and
procedures, vs. concern for the differences among learners or the selection of
instructional materials (Saettler, 1968).
The use of audiovisual media had been little influenced by theory-oriented
research and generally ignored psychological theory, stressing group
presentation of materials without explicit regard for individual differences in 
learning ability. Whereas, a “technology of instruction" was oriented toward
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theory, the psychological principles, and empirical data was based on the total 
teaching-learning processes. This issue provided yet another impetus, during the 
late 1940s, for reassessing the state of the visual movement: concern revolved 
around visual instruction’s relationships to the educational technology and
instructional theory (Saettler, 1968).
From the earliest days of the visual instruction movement the predominant
theoretical rationale justifying the visual approach to instruction was based 
on the concept that visual materials would serve as an antidote for
verbalism. The traditional rationale has identified devices, machines, or
media, use of particular senses (primarily visual), and characteristics of 
instructional aids or teaching materials on the basis of their levels of 
concreteness or abstractness. (Saettler, 1990, p. 140)
During the postwar period, “both audiovisualists and educators generally 
developed an increased sensitivity to the applicability of scientific theories of 
learning to practical problems of instruction. Moreover, there evolved an
increased sophistication concerning the function and role of the media and/or
communications specialist within the total context of instructional technology”
(Saettler, p. 180).
The physical science (media) concept predated the second concept, the
behavioral science concept, by several decades: This concept was of more
recent origin, from the World War I era and the impetus the war gave to
psychology in the areas of intelligence tests and statistical measures. “Ironically,
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even though behaviorism developed in the early decades of this [twentieth] 
century, it did not exert any great influence on educational technology until about 
the time its dominance in American psychology was beginning to wane in the 
1960s. Behaviorism began to make an impact on educational technology in the 
early 1960s, with B. F. Skinner’s concepts of reinforcement and with applications 
in teaching machines and programmed instruction” (Saettler, 1990, p. 286). 
Behaviorist-influenced “systems approaches to solving educational problems 
originated in military and industrial training but later emerged in university 
research and development projects. K-12 practices began to reflect systems 
approaches when university personnel began advocating them in their work with 
schools” (p. 6).
Robert Glaser, B. F. Skinner, and Edward Thorndike were among the
noted behaviorists during the interwar years. Thorndike was an educator whose 
theories and methods, according to Saettler (1968), produced or fostered a
modern science and technology of instruction and, along with John Dewey, 
dominated much of the thought and practice of American education during the 
first half of the 20th century. Thorndike, an educational psychologist, fashioned 
the first scientific learning theory and established empirical investigation as a
basis for a science of instruction. In fact, it was Thorndike who, in 1902, offered
the first course in educational measurements at Columbia University and
became the first to apply the methods of quantitative research to instructional
problems (p. 47-8). “Behaviorist theories held sway initially and cognitive theories
gained influence later” (Roblyerand Edwards, p. 2000, p. 6-7).
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Behaviorists stressed that educational practice should be more dependent 
on the methods of science as developed by behavioral scientists in broad areas 
of psychology, anthropology, sociology, and in specialized areas of learning, 
group processes, language, and communications. The term behavioral science 
first began to be widely accepted in the 1950s when the Ford Foundation 
supported the Behavioral Science Program with several million dollars (Saettler,
1968).
The behavioral science concept, and the behaviorist impact on
educational technology, provided the impetus for the beginning of the 
instructional design movement and the advent of a systematic approach to 
instruction (Saettler, 1990). This approach added another dimension to the
existing media-and-audiovisual-communications view of technology in education.
“The traditional theoretical framework of educational technology had emphasized
the stimuli or messages to the learner; behaviorism shifted the learning
emphasis onto the behavior of the learner and its reinforcement. Thus, the
primary purpose of media became reinforcement rather than merely
presentation” (Saettler, 1990, p. 286).
Following the behaviorists came the information processing theories of
Richard Atkinson and David Ausubel. Robert Gagne built upon both behavioral
and cognitive theories in playing a key role in the development of instructional
systems design (Roblyer and Edwards, p. 2000). Systems approaches to solving
educational problems shifted to the belief that both human (teachers) and non­
human resources (media) could be integrated as parts of a system— the
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analysis, design, development, and delivery of instruction—for addressing the
needs of learners. From this perspective, educational technology was not seen 
just as a medium for the diffusion of knowledge, but as a systematic approach to 
designing, developing, and delivering instruction matched to carefully identified 
learner needs (Heinich et al., 1996). Resources for delivering instruction were 
identified only after detailed and careful analysis of learning goals, objectives, 
and tasks, and the appropriate instructional strategies that were deemed as 
being required to teach them (Roblyer and Edwards, p. 2000).
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Section VII: 
CONCLUSION
In this study I attempted to demonstrate that the organizations, 
educational and political issues, and legislation described in the first three 
sections represented early, crucial elements in federal intervention in educational 
matters and the emergence of the formative patterns of instructional technology 
in American educational practice: What were the significant historical events that 
prompted federal intervention, in terms of research sponsorship and funding of 
education? What role did instructional technology and media play during periods 
of national crises in terms of military training and industrial manpower 
preparedness? What roles did the wartime preparedness, industry workforce 
training, training in the sciences, and federal legislation play in the development
of modern instructional methodologies?
During the late 1940s and the 1950s, the impetus for much of the federal 
government’s role in education, the evolution of instructional technologies and 
media, and university-based research was in reaction to world events, national 
defense needs, and concern for the country’s economic and scientific 
competitiveness. Therefore, in subsequent sections of the study, federal 
interventions in education are described in terms of the increasingly broader
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definitions of what the nation’s defense and public welfare might encompass,
and the potential roles that education and instructional technologies would be
called upon to assume: What events prompted the National Science Foundation
(NSF) Act of 1950, the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958? What
were the influences and outcomes from the aforementioned and subsequent
federal legislation that impacted science and math education, and advances in
the utilization of new instructional technologies, materials, and teaching aids in 
the classroom and scientific and technical training programs? How did 
instructional technology—as visual instruction, and later as audiovisual
communications—in education evolve in the United States?
Federal Interventions in Time of Crises and National Embarrassments
Throughout our nation’s history there have been significant events,
legislation, and other evidence of a gradual and significant federal involvement in 
education. The national welfare, defense of the nation, and racial desegregation, 
among others, are issues that have provided legislators and presidents with
rationale for federal intervention and financial aid. The Morrill Land-Grant Act of
1862 is an early example: this legislation was passed during the outbreak of the 
Civil War, and is generally regarded as the first overt involvement in education by 
the federal government in the history of the United States.
Federal interventions in scientific research and educational matters—
particularly in higher education—began to accelerate prior to World War II as 
education was called upon to support the national agendas of wartime
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preparedness, manpower training, and later competition with the Soviet Union 
and reclaiming global leadership in science and technology. Following the war,
most Americans anticipated a period of relative peace, and had expectations of 
economic improvement and increased prosperity. Instead, the decade following 
the war proved to be one of uncertainty and was characterized by crises both at
home and abroad. Federal education legislation during this time frame was 
fixated on education as a response to a Cold War emergency (the launching of
Sputnik) and in reaction to forces of social and technological change working in
America.
On the international stage, Sputnik sparked concern in the nation 
regarding its science, technology, and educational leadership. There was fear in 
Congress and in the Eisenhower administration that the nation had lost the
space race and academic superiority to the Soviets. In particular, the Naval
Research laboratory’s failed attempt to launch a Vanguard rocket carrying an
American satellite, two months following the first Sputnik launch, reinforced the
resolve for legislation that would increase the prowess of American science,
technology, and education.
The national embarrassment of Sputnik and the Vanguard failures and
worries about America's faltering technological leadership and competitiveness
during the Cold War added another dimension to the on-going, and often
complex and acrimonious, debate in education among advocates of schooling
for social development and advocates of schooling for intellectual excellence.
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“The latter tend to prevail during periods of heightened international competition”
(Kaestle and Smith, 1982, p. 393).
The expansion in the science training role of the National Science
Foundation and passage of the NDEA in 1958 represented the first critical 
milestones in federal education-related efforts that attempted to find solutions to
those events, needs, and concerns by directly funding the nation’s schools and 
universities. Emerging from the period marked by the end of World War II,
Sputnik and the passage of the NDEA came a vigorous re-assessment of 
education, new developments in the area of instructional methodology, and early 
efforts to explore the potential role for technology in America’s classrooms— all 
in the name of national defense and security. Of significance is that fact the 
NDEA promoted federal interest in, and direct support for, science and 
mathematics education at the elementary and secondary levels (as well as 
higher education). As previously noted in this study, it was not until the mid- to
late-nineteenth century that America’s institutions of higher education moved
from curricula that stressed classical education, to curricula that began to place
more stress on the sciences, engineering, math, and graduate level studies.
The NDEA, in particular, was for the American people, a call to arms
because of the seemingly poor preparation children were receiving in America’s
schools to play the leading role in world affairs. This act was passed to provide
substantial finance assistance to students, schools, and states to ensure a future
supply of trained people to meet the national defense needs of the U. S. in the
Cold War. The Russians, it seemed by the launch of the Sputnik, were
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surpassing the U. S. in knowledge of science, mathematics, and the ability to 
bring new technology to the global marketplace.
On the home front, school desegregation and the emergence of the Civil 
Rights Movement occupied the attention of politicians, educators, and the nation 
as a whole. Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954) and a 
plethora of later cases; and later the Civil Rights Act of 1964, federal judicial and 
legislative interventions brought about the first significant steps toward 
integrating the nation’s schools. Of equal importance to the nation’s minorities, 
this federal intervention made it increasingly possible for racial minorities and 
historically Black colleges and universities to benefit from the aforementioned
federal education legislation.
However, as Urban and Wagoner (2000) explain, implementing the 
integration of schools proved far more difficult than most proponents had
envisioned:
There were several reasons for this difficulty. First, the federal courts had
no agency to enforce their mandates. Second, the office of the president, 
particularly under the Eisenhower administration, failed to act decisively
on behalf of the Brown mandate. Third, Congress through its seniority and
committee system, was controlled by southern legislators pledged either 
to the ideology of “massive resistance” to Brown or to a studied inaction
that amounted to the same thing, (p. 321)
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Setting the Precedent for Federal Aid to Education
While the nation had what originally appeared to be a joint, independently- 
run private / public higher education system, its development came to be 
dominated by the federal government in terms of fundamental initiatives and 
guidelines as a result of World War II, the Cold War, and the national welfare in 
general. Previously, the great initiative that impacted higher education in 
particular was the Morrill Land-Grant Act of 1862. With World War II came the 
decision to have the federal government to rely on universities for basic and 
applied research and the Gl Bill of Rights of 1944. “These three initiatives taken 
together, more than all other policy initiatives, have impacted the development of 
the American ‘system’ of higher education. To the extent that it is a ‘system’, it is 
a federally influenced system: e pluribus unum” (Kerr, p. 27).
The Cold War brought the National Defense Education Act of 1958. 
Although the NDEA and subsequent legislation of the 1960s marked an 
expansion of the federal government’s categorical aid to education, they can 
hardly be considered radical. The federal government’s periodic assertion that 
good education was in the national interest, the sustained precedent of the 
Smith-Hughes Act (and subsequent vocational legislation), and the 
Congressional habit to intervene in interest of manpower problems during the 
Great Depression, World War II, and the Civil Rights era of the 1960s— all 
contributing to the context within which the NDEA and the Great Society 
programs were created and evolved. And, similarly, the Brown v. Board of
128
Education (1954) marked a new incursion by the federal judiciary to ensure 
equal educational opportunities for all students, regardless of race.
For the nation, therefore, the tone and tenor for future federal involvement
with schooling had been set. Fass (1986) describes this circumstance:
Since the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
and especially since the 1960s, Americans have become accustomed to
active federal participation in education. We often assume that the recent
past emerged from a kind of tabula rasa, a long prehistory of federal 
quiescence in which educational matters rested exclusively and naturally
in the domain of the states and local school districts, where the silence of
the Constitution seemed to leave the matter. In fact, American history is
dotted with instances of federal activity affecting education. Usually, 
however, these were simple legislative acts....Rarely did the federal 
government actively design a set of programs or policies, which reach
broadly and deeply into the realm of education. The one important
exception was the New Deal. The reform activities initiated by Franklin
Roosevelt in the 1930s to cope with the devastations of the Depression
were unprecedented in many ways. Not the least of these was the 
significant educational dimension of federal intervention, which was
carved out of the jigsaw pattern of economic relief. The federal activity 
was not only fundamentally new but had significant implications for
defining a new federal responsibility in educational matters which
anticipated our more recent experiences...fundamentally altered beliefs
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about the role of the federal government in the area of education and
raised, without completely defining, a new ideal of education as an
entitlement, (p. 22-23)
At first blush, it seems that there is a logical connection between national 
crises and the establishing of national educational policy. According to Kaestle 
and Smith (1982), wars, both hot and cold, “threaten and unite a nation, creating 
reasons for large-scale mobilization of talent and resources that tend to outweigh
traditional resistance to centralized control of education” (p. 391). “All nations, in 
war and in peace, have used schools to inculcate nationalism. Whether schools 
could aid world peace by advocating peace and international government is a 
moot point; in this, as in so many matters, schools are more reflective of society 
than instrumental in causing its problems or solutions” (p. 392).
Establishing a national educational policy would prove to be difficult and 
frustrating for the federal government. Among the many challenges facing the 
federal government in its efforts to upgrade and improve the nation’s schools
and universities there were two potential inhibitors— the lack of a centralized
school system in this country and the prevalence of racial and gender
discrimination:
• The fragmented, decentralized nature of U.S. education had the
potential to restrict the spread of new technology, especially to
small or remote school districts, private schools, and minority
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groups—where its effect would be greatest in guaranteeing a
minimum level of education.
• Wide-spread segregation in the nations school systems and higher 
education, and the prevailing notions of gender bias, contributed, in 
part, to compromising the effectiveness of educational legislation in 
reaching and positively impacting women, racial minorities, and 
historically Black colleges and universities.
The NDEA was unprecedented in many respects, but in reality the total 
amount of federal aid that was appropriated to education was not large: “total 
allocations did not equal either the school milk and lunch programs or the federal 
aid to impacted areas programs” (Kaestle and Smith, 1982, p. 394). “The long- 
lasting effect of the legislation, however, was in the precedent that had been set. 
Rather than continuing the trend of single-purpose legislation, the passage of 
this act legitimized broad-based federal aid to education for the first time. The full 
scope of the federal efforts was not felt until midway through the next decade,
when President Lyndon Johnson piloted through Congress a more
comprehensive and wider-ranging educational aid law” (Urban and Wagoner, 
2000, p. 296-7). The NDEA, nevertheless, had put the federal government firmly
on the side of educational aid for specific purposes (Kaestle and Smith, 1982).
The NDEA—coupled with initiatives from business and industry, the Ford
Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation—
began to funnel funds to the nation’s schools, adult learning environments, and
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employment training programs for the construction of new learning facilities, 
purchasing equipment, and integrating modern electronic and mechanical aids 
into the process of education. Together, the NDEA and the aforementioned 
organizations represented important elements of a national agenda to upgrade 
and expand the scope of math, engineering, and science learning in America’s 
schools—with the goal of re-establishing and maintaining excellence in 
America’s schools. Although the NDEA no longer exists as an independent
statute, its impact remains today (Russo, 2001).
Science for National Prestige and Security
America’s responses to Sputnik and its Cold War technological
achievements bolstered the credibility of research as a source of protection 
against ostensibly hostile nations and were central to shaping federal research 
policymaking during the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, these responses 
also led to a fragmentation of research policymaking and did little to improve the
coordination of critical research.
Sputnik played an important symbolic role in prompting the creation of
several new federal organizations devoted to scientific research and 
development: Within the context of the nation’s hysteria over Sputnik and in the
interest of national security, the National Aeronautic and Space Administration
(NASA) was created a year after the launch of Sputnik to replace NACA.
Established in 1915, NACA was established to foster aviation progress in the U.
S. and had been moving into space-related areas of research and engineering
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during the 1950s. NASA solved the problem of promoting civilian space 
research by consolidating all space exploration projects under an single 
administration and provided a focal point for United States’ efforts to compete 
with and eventually win against the Soviets in the space race. The Defense 
Department was, therefore, to restrict its efforts to secret programs with direct
military application.
Next came the creation, within the Defense Department of the Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA), in response to the Department’s need for 
high-level attention to promising longer-term research projects and to explore 
advanced technologies. Since its creation, ARPA has contributed to various 
important technological innovations in areas from computers to materials 
science. It has no labs of it own, but instead supports university and industry 
research, paying these organizations to push the envelope of high-risk, high 
payoff technological ventures. The agency’s list of significant developments 
include: Stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, robotics, satellite, artificial intelligence,
and the ARPA-Net, the forerunner to the Internet.
The rhetoric of the Cold War and the national embarrassment of Sputnik
meant an orientation was established toward science for national prestige and
security. Historical junctures viewed as crises motivated the change.
The Promise of Instructional Technology and Media
In his comprehensive historical survey of educational technology, The
Evolution of American Educational Technology (1990), Saettler writes: “It is clear
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that educational technology is essentially the product of a great historical stream
consisting of trial and error, long practice and imitation, and sporadic
manifestations of unusual individual creativity and persuasion” (p. 4). He further
notes that the earliest reference that he can confirm regarding the use of the
term education technology was in an interview with W. W. Charters in 1948; the
earliest known reference he finds for the term instructional technology was in a
1963 forward by James Finn for a technology development project sponsored by
the National Education Association.
Instructional technology such as audiovisual media existed prior to World 
War II to facilitate learning. Yet, it was this war and the federal government’s 
postwar education intervention through legislation (such as the NDEA and its 
direct financial aid to education) that helped to support use of media technology 
and accelerate the pace of the development of the first systematic applications of
media for instructional purposes.
Several important factors brought about this development and utilization
of instructional technology during the war: (a) the establishment of industrial and 
military training programs which produced unprecedented demands for effective
instructional technologies, (b) the emergence of federal and military policies that 
encouraged the broad use of instructional media and production of a wide variety
of instructional materials, leveraging pre-war scientific research into a technology
of instruction; and, (c) the allocation of almost unlimited financial resources for
the implementation of instructional technology to meet wartime needs.
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Since the advent of the visual education movement, the use of media had
been little influenced by theory-oriented research and generally ignored 
psychological theory. Instead, initiatives to implement media tended to stress 
group presentation of materials without explicit regard for individual differences in 
learning ability. Likewise, the various media movements, and society in general, 
became fascinated with each introduction of new media technology. The use of
visual aids became disconnected from educational theory. The existence of a
relationship between increased utilization of audiovisual media and the 
emergence of communications and, later, behaviorist theory that espoused 
sensory experiences as being essential to learning, were found to be 
fragmentary and fragile at best.
Audiovisual media was viewed as tools or aids to instruction and tended
to be more concerned with the effects of the various instructional devices and
procedures vs. concern for the differences among learners or the selection of 
instructional materials (Saettler, 1968). Saettler (1990) adds:
From the earliest days of the visual instruction movement the predominant
theoretical rationale justifying the visual approach to instruction was based
on the concept that visual materials would serve as an antidote for
verbalism. The traditional rationale has identified devices, machines, or
media, use of particular senses (primarily visual), and characteristics of
instructional aids or teaching materials on the basis of their levels of
concreteness or abstractness, (p. 140)
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It would take several decades, until the 1950s, for the emphasis in
audiovisual instruction “to shift from the ‘things’ of the instructional situation to
the complete communications process involved in transmitting information from a
source (a teacher) to a receiver (the learner)” (Saettler, 1990, p. 167).
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